The Florida Senate
BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(This document is based on the provisions contained in the legislation as of the latest date listed below.)
Prepared By: The Professional Staff of the Committee on Rules
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932
INTRODUCER: Rules Committee; Children, Families, and Elder Affairs Committee; and Senator Wright
SUBJECT: Minor Time-sharing for Parent Convicted of or Had Adjudication Withheld for a
Specified Offense
DATE: April 7, 2021 REVISED:
ANALYST STAFF DIRECTOR REFERENCE ACTION
1. Moody Cox CF Fav/CS
2. Erickson Jones CJ Favorable
3. Moody Phelps RC Fav/CS
Please see Section IX. for Additional Information:
COMMITTEE SUBSTITUTE - Substantial Changes
I. Summary:
CS/CS/SB 932 amends s. 61.13, F.S., expanding the application of the rebuttable presumption of
detriment to the child to include when a parent has been convicted or had adjudication withheld
for an offense enumerated in s. 943.0435(1)(h)1.a., F.S. (offense criteria relevant to sexual
offender registration), and at the time of the offense:
 The parent was 18 years of age or older; and
 The victim was under 18 years of age or the parent believed the victim was under 18 years of
age.
A rebuttable presumption against granting a parent time-sharing with his or her minor child is
also created based on the same criteria. The bill provides that the presumption against granting
time-sharing may be rebutted upon the court making written findings that the parent poses no
significant risk of harm to the child and that time-sharing is in the child’s best interest. If the
presumption is rebutted, the bill also requires the court to consider all time-sharing factors
provided for in s. 61.13(3), F.S.
To the extent that the bill results in additional litigation relating to the ability to have time-
sharing rights, the bill may result in an increased workload on the state court system from
additional or more lengthy hearings and an indeterminate fiscal impact on parents who must pay
additional legal fees related to such hearings. See Section V. Fiscal Impact Section.
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932 Page 2
The bill is effective July 1, 2021.
II. Present Situation:
Parental Rights
The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is a recognized
fundamental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. This fundamental liberty interest is rooted in the fundamental right of
privacy from interference in making important decisions relating to marriage, family
relationships, child rearing, and education.1 The United States Supreme Court has explained the
fundamental nature of this right is rooted in history and tradition:
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.2
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that under Art. I., s. 23 of the Florida Constitution,
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in determining the care and upbringing of their
children.3 These rights may not be intruded upon absent a compelling state interest.4 According
to the Florida Supreme Court, when analyzing a statute that infringes on the fundamental right of
privacy, the applicable standard of review requires that the statute survive the highest level of
scrutiny:
The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe demands the compelling
state interest standard. This test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an
intrusion on privacy. The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of
the least intrusive means.5
1
Carey v. Population Svcs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977) (recognizing the right of privacy in personal decisions
relating to marriage, family relationships, child rearing, and education). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972)
(holding a state law requiring that children attend school past eighth grade violates the parents’ constitutional right to direct
the religious upbringing of their children); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing the presumption that
parents act in their children’s best interest); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (affirming that the Constitution
protects the preferences of the parent in education over those of the state); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names
of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right of parents to direct the upbringing of and education of
their children).
2
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
3
Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996) (holding a state law violated a parent’s constitutional right to privacy
by imposing grandparent visitation rights over objection of the parent without evidence of harm to the child or other
compelling state interest).
4
Id. See, e.g., Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 1980) and Belair v. Drew,
776 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
5
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Dept. of Bus. Regulation, 477 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985) (citations omitted).
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932 Page 3
Parental Time-Sharing
Parental time-sharing is the time, including overnights and holidays, which a minor child spends
with each parent.6 A parent’s right to time-sharing is not absolute, and the Legislature may enact
a time-sharing policy when it affects the best interest of the child.7 As a result of the
constitutional right to a meaningful parent-child relationship, there must be competent,
substantial evidence in the record that demonstrates that any restrictions or limitations on time-
sharing are in the best interests of the child before those restrictions will be sustained.8 Thus,
where there is no evidence that the noncustodial parent is unfit, that extreme circumstances
preclude visitation, or that visitation would adversely affect the welfare of the child, the trial
court abuses its discretion in failing to provide visitation rights for that parent.9 Moreover,
restriction of visitation is generally disfavored, unless the restriction is necessary to protect the
welfare of the child.10
Section 61.13(2), F.S., provides judges wide discretion in determining matters relating to
parenting and time-sharing of minor children in actions under ch. 61, F.S., in accordance with the
best interests of the child, while balancing the rights of parents. The court is required to
determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in
accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).11
In establishing time-sharing, the court must make a determination of the best interests of the
child by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor
child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to, the:
 Demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a continuing
parent-child relationship, honor the time-sharing schedule, and accommodate necessary
changes.
 Anticipated division of parental responsibilities after the litigation, including the extent to
which parental responsibilities will be delegated to third parties.
 Demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to determine, consider, and act upon
the needs of the child.
 Length of time the child has lived in a stable environment and the desirability of maintaining
continuity.
 Geographic viability of the parenting plan, with special attention paid to the needs of school-
age children and the amount of time to be spent traveling to effectuate the parenting plan.
6
See s. 61.046(23), F.S. The schedule may be developed and agreed to by the parents of a minor child and approved by the
court or established by the court if the parents cannot agree or if their agreed-upon schedule is not approved by the court.
7
See, e.g., Mallick v. Mallick, 2020 WL 6106287 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 16, 2020); Bainbridge v. Pratt, 168 So.3d 310 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2011).
8
Miller v. Miller, 302 So.3d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020).
9
McArdle v. McArdle, 753 So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Johnston v. Boram, 386 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
10
See Munoz v. Munoz, 210 So.3d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Davis v. Lopez-Davis, 162 So.3d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
11
Section 61.13(2)(c), F.S. The UCCJEA was developed by the Legal Resource Center on Violence Against Women, the
National Center on State Courts, and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) to address
jurisdictional and enforcement issues in child custody cases. The NCJFCJ, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act: Guide for Court Personnel and Judges, July 18, 2018, available at
https://www.ncjfcj.org/publications/uniform-child-custody-jurisdiction-and-enforcement-act-guide-for-court-personnel-and-
judges/ (last visited April 7, 2021).
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932 Page 4
 Mental health, physical health, and moral fitness of the parents.
 Home, school, and community record of the child.
 Reasonable preference of the child.
 Demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition of each parent to be informed of the
circumstances of the minor child, including, the child’s friends, teachers, and daily activities.
 Demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to:
o Provide a consistent routine; and
o Communicate with and keep the other parent informed of issues and activities regarding
the minor child, and the willingness of each parent to adopt a unified front on all major
issues when dealing with the child.
 Evidence of domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandonment, or child
neglect, or that either parent has ever knowingly provided false information about such
matters.
 Particular parenting tasks customarily performed by each parent, including the extent to
which parenting responsibilities were undertaken by third parties.
 Demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to participate and be involved in the
child’s school and extracurricular activities.
 Demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to maintain an environment for the
child which is free from substance abuse.
 Capacity and disposition of each parent to protect the child from the ongoing litigation
regarding child custody.
 Developmental stages and needs of the child and the demonstrated capacity and disposition
of each parent to meet the child’s developmental needs.12
Further, the court may order sole parental responsibility and make such arrangements for time-
sharing as will best protect the child or abused spouse from further harm if the court determines
that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.13 Current law provides for a
rebuttable presumption14 that parental time-sharing would be detrimental to the child if there is
evidence that:
 A parent has been convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher involving
domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, F.S., and ch. 775, F.S.; or
 Meets the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d), F.S., relating to grounds for termination of parental
rights of incarcerated parents.15
If the presumption is not rebutted, shared parental responsibility, including time-sharing and
decisions regarding the child, may not be granted to the convicted parent.16 In any event, the
convicted parent is not relieved of any obligation to provide financial support.17 The court may
12
Section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), F.S.
13
Section 61.13(2)(c)2., F.S.
14
Every rebuttable presumption is either a presumption: (a) affecting the burden of producing evidence and requiring the trier
of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact, unless credible sufficient evidence is introduced to the contrary in which
case the trier of fact must determine whether the fact has been proven without regard to the presumption; or (b) affecting the
burden of proof that imposes upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof concerning the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. Section 90.302, F.S.
15
Section 61.13(2)(c)2., F.S.
16
Id.
17
Id.
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932 Page 5
consider evidence of domestic violence or child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child even
if the parent is not convicted of any such offenses or an injunction for protection against
domestic violence has not been issued.18
Currently, Florida law does not expressly prohibit a sex offender from exercising time-sharing
with his or her minor child unless there is a court order to the contrary.
Although current law requires the court to acknowledge in writing when it considers evidence of
sexual violence in evaluating the best interests of the child,19 it is possible to be classified as a
sexual offender without committing a violent sexual act.20 Therefore, under current law, a sexual
offender who has not committed a violent sexual act may still be entitled to time-sharing with a
minor child.
Termination of Parental Rights
Section 39.806, F.S., authorizes the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to file a petition
for termination of parental rights (TPR) against both parents when they fail to remedy the family
problems that brought a child into the dependency system.21 Alternatively, the DCF may move to
terminate only one of the parent’s rights if it can prove certain grounds, such as incarceration,
egregious conduct, chronic substance abuse, the conception of the child as a result of sexual
battery, a conviction requiring the parent to register as a sexual predator, or an incarcerated
parent who the court determined is a sexual predator in s. 775.084, F.S., or committed a sexual
battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony in violation of s. 794.011, F.S.22
Sexual Offenses
Sexual offenses enumerated under s. 943.0435(1)(h)1.a., F.S., include:
 Sexual misconduct with a person having a developmental disability (s. 393.135(2), F.S.);
 Sexual misconduct with a mental health patient by an employee (s. 394.4593(2), F.S.);
 Specified violations of kidnapping or falsely imprisoning a minor (s. 787.01 or s. 787.02,
F.S.);23
 Luring or enticing a child, by a person with a prior sexual conviction (s. 787.025(2), F.S.);
 Human trafficking for commercial sexual activity (s. 787.06(3)(b), (d), (f), or (g), F.S.);
 Sexual battery (s. 794.011, excluding s. 794.011(10), F.S.);
 Unlawful sexual activity with a minor (s. 794.05, F.S.);
 Lewd or lascivious battery, molestation, conduct, or exhibition (s. 800.04, F.S.);
 Video voyeurism, involving a minor victim (s. 810.145(8), F.S.);
 Lewd or lascivious offense on an elderly or disabled person (s. 825.1025, F.S.);
 Sexual performance by a child (s. 827.071, F.S.);
18
Section 61.13(2)(c)2., F.S.
19
Section 61.13(3)(m), F.S.
20
For example, an offender might have been required to register as a sexual offender based on a felony conviction for video
voyeurism. See s. 810.145, F.S.
21
Section 39.8055, F.S.
22
Section 39.806, F.S.
23
However, the Florida Supreme Court has held there must be a sexual element to the kidnapping or false imprisonment
when the victim is a minor. State v. Robinson, 873 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2004).
BILL: CS/CS/SB 932 Page 6
 Providing obscene materials to a minor (s. 847.0133, F.S.);
 Computer pornography involving a minor (s. 847.0135(2), F.S.);
 Soliciting a minor over the Internet (s. 847.0135(3), F.S.);
 Traveling to meet a minor (s. 847.0135(4), F.S.);
 Lewd or lascivious exhibition over the Internet (s. 847.0135(5), F.S.);
 Transmitting child pornography b