[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4570 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4570
To incentivize, streamline, and sustain United States foreign
government partner procurement of United States-origin cyber and
digital technologies.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 19, 2026
Mrs. Shaheen (for herself and Mr. Ricketts) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To incentivize, streamline, and sustain United States foreign
government partner procurement of United States-origin cyber and
digital technologies.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``U.S. Technology Procurement and
Access to Trusted Hardware Act'' or the ``U.S. Tech PATH Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations in the
Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House
of Representatives.
(2) Foreign country of concern.--The term ``foreign country
of concern'' has the meaning given the term ``covered nation''
in section 4872(f) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Foreign government partner.--The term ``foreign
government partner'' includes international organizations.
(4) International organizations.--The term ``international
organizations'' has the meaning given the term in section 1 of
the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288).
(5) Trusted cyber and digital technologies.--The term
``trusted cyber and digital technologies'' means technologies,
including equipment, services, hardware, or software used in
information and communications technology networks, for which
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Commerce, has determined--
(A) the provider, supplier, or manufacturer is not
owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of
a foreign country of concern; and
(B) do not pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security of the United States or the security
and safety of United States persons.
(6) Pax silica initiative.--The term ``Pax Silica
initiative'' refers to the Department of State-led diplomatic,
economic security, and supply chain initiative, announced on
December 11, 2025, to strengthen cooperation among the United
States, allied countries, partner countries, industry, and
other relevant stakeholders for the purpose of developing and
securing trusted supply chains and infrastructure necessary for
artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced
manufacturing, and other technologies determined by the
Secretary of State to be essential to United States national
security, economic security, and technological competitiveness.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) foreign government partners are increasingly turning
towards strategic competitors like the People's Republic of
China to procure cyber and digital technologies due to their
low-cost, acceptable efficiency, and associated training and
maintenance;
(2) foreign government partner procurement of cyber and
digital technologies from suppliers aligned with strategic
competitors of the United States poses significant and distinct
risks, including--
(A) supply chain vulnerabilities created by
dependence on strategic competitors whose governments
may compel access to data, networks, or systems,
undermining the cybersecurity and strategic autonomy of
the procuring government;
(B) the erosion of interoperability and alignment
with United States cybersecurity frameworks, standards,
and best practices, reducing the ability of foreign
government partners to operate securely alongside
United States systems and those of United States
allies; and
(C) the adoption of digital governance practices
that are inconsistent with United States economic and
national security interests;
(3) United States foreign government partners consistently
signal strong demand for cyber and digital technologies from
trusted United States suppliers;
(4) United States initiatives such as Pax Silica should
facilitate technology procurements by building enduring
technology partnerships between foreign government partners and
United States suppliers, including by--
(A) assisting foreign government partners in
navigating regulatory, logistical, and technical
hurdles to cyber and digital technology procurement;
(B) providing foreign government partners with
strategic direction from the United States Government;
(C) incorporating foreign government partner needs
into program development from the outset; and
(D) maintaining long-term engagement with foreign
government partners throughout the procurement cycle of
trusted cyber and digital technologies; and
(5) as the United States seeks to maintain its global
competitive edge in critical and emerging technologies,
including artificial intelligence, advanced telecommunications,
and robotics, it is in the interest of the United States
Government to establish policies and procedures that streamline
foreign government partners' ability to procure trusted and
reliable technologies from the United States and United States
allies and partners.
SEC. 4. UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department of State
the United States Cyber and Digital Technology Procurement Program
(referred to in this Act as the ``Program''), which shall be
administered by the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, and which
may support Pax Silica and other related initiatives. To the maximum
extent practicable, the Program shall seek to serve as a demand-driven
mechanism in response to cyber and digital technology needs as
determined by the participating foreign government partner.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the Program shall include the
following:
(1) To streamline foreign government partner procurement of
trusted cyber and digital technologies, including commercial
off-the-shelf technologies, consistent with United States
export control laws and cybersecurity standards.
(2) To establish long-term cyber and digital technology
procurement pipelines with United States providers, including
after the termination of the Program.
(3) To identify the appropriate United States Government
financing mechanisms to address challenges associated with
affordability.
(4) To provide a comprehensive package to foreign
government partners that eases the navigation of cyber and
digital technology procurement requirements, technical and
system complexity, absorptive capacity, and foreign government
partner-specific logistical and export controls, including by--
(A) designing and implementing logistics,
procurement, deployment, and technical knowledge-
transfer plans that enable the participating foreign
government partner to modernize and secure systems;
(B) providing clear guidelines for United States
and trusted foreign supplier entry and eligibility;
(C) conducting assessments related to the
participating foreign government partner's workforce or
technological needs, including any gaps in absorptive
capacity, including--
(i) feasibility studies to identify,
design, and implement the deployment of cyber
and digital technology solutions; and
(ii) sustainability assessments to
determine the participating foreign government
partner's ability to procure and invest in
trusted cyber and digital technologies,
including the ability to sustain such
investments in the long-term;
(D) providing capacity building to ensure that the
participating foreign government partner obtains the
relevant skills for requirements identification and
assessment, integration of United States procurements
into existing operating environments, research and
procurement, logistics, deployment, and configuration
to ensure a long-term arrangement with United States
suppliers; and
(E) assisting the participating foreign government
partner in developing a long-term strategy to procure
and budget for trusted cyber and digital technology
procurements, including beyond the end of the Program's
lifecycle.
(5) To assess the risks and tradeoffs of foreign government
partners adopting cyber and digital technologies from foreign
countries of concern and prioritize foreign government partners
for outreach efforts based on that risk assessment.
(c) Covered Cyber and Digital Technologies.--In implementing the
Program, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the
participating foreign government partner, prioritize the following
cyber and digital technologies, as well as any other cyber and digital
technologies designated by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d):
(1) Software and its associated subscriptions and
licensing, including--
(A) operating systems;
(B) enterprise management software;
(C) cloud-based storage solutions and compute
access;
(D) industrial control and automation software,
including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA), distributed control systems (DCS), and
programmable logic controller (PLC) programming
environments;
(E) digital twin, simulation, and modeling
software; and
(F) cloud and edge orchestration platforms for
robotic and operational technology (OT) device
management.
(2) Hardware, including--
(A) processors;
(B) human-machine interfaces (HMIs) and operator
consoles;
(C) networking equipment, including switches,
routers, and gateways;
(D) industrial networking equipment;
(E) biotechnology equipment, including genomic
sequencers and related hardware; and
(F) other related technologies.
(3) Cybersecurity products, including--
(A) firewalls;
(B) intrusion detection and prevention systems;
(C) Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) systems;
(D) threat intelligence and monitoring systems;
(E) endpoint detection systems;
(F) Security Operations Centers (SOC); and
(G) secure authentication systems.
(4) Telecommunications equipment, including--
(A) subsea fiber-optic cable and associated
equipment;
(B) cellular equipment, including open radio access
network (ORAN) equipment; and
(C) satellite-enabling infrastructure.
(5) Equipment and related products to enable the adoption
of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions, including--
(A) compute;
(B) storage;
(C) memory;
(D) models, including both closed- and open-weight
models;
(E) AI model licenses;
(F) edge AI capabilities, including next-generation
smartphone technology and relevant mobile operating
systems; and
(G) AI model applications.
(d) Annual Review of Covered Cyber and Digital Technologies.--The
Secretary of State shall conduct an annual assessment to identify the
inclusion or removal of technologies under subsection (c) based on the
national security risk to the United States of a foreign country of
concern gaining significant market share of such technology within a
foreign government partner country.
(e) Risk Mitigation Requirements.--Before approving a partnership
under the Program, the Secretary shall--
(1) conduct an assessment of technology misuse and
diversion risks, including--
(A) the foreign government partner's export control
enforcement capacity;
(B) the foreign government partner's history of
technology transfer to foreign countries of concern,
including permitting remote access to technology; and
(C) investments by foreign countries of concern in
the foreign government partner's critical sectors;
(2) establish monitoring and mitigation requirements
proportional to the risk assessed under paragraph (1);
(3) include end-use monitoring provisions in all Program
agreements; and
(4) coordinate with the intelligence community and the
Department of Defense regarding counterintelligence and
national security risks.
(f) Foreign Government Partner Contribution.--For any partnership
with a foreign government partner under the Program, the Secretary
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, seek to ensure cost-sharing
with the foreign government partner to facilitate the foreign
government partner's long-term buy-in and sustained procurements of
cyber and digital technologies.
(g) Additional Interagency Coordination.--In implementing the
Program, to address challenges associated with affordability,
financing, technical evaluations, procurement requirements, and long-
term capacity building, the Secretary of State shall, on a case-by-case
basis, coordinate, as appropriate, with the relevant Federal agencies,
including the Department of Commerce, the Department of Homeland
Security, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United
States International Development Finance Cooperation, and the United
States Trade and Development Agency.
(h) Use of Funds.--Funds made available to carry out the Program
shall be used--
(1) to provide assistance or financing--
(A) to foreign government partner civilian
government agencies; or
(B) to law enforcement or military agencies, only
if such entities are the owners and operators of the
foreign government partner's civilian critical
infrastructure; and
(2) to develop blended finance mechanisms, co-developed
with the participating foreign government partner, that
partners with fund managers, project developers, third-party
investors, infrastructure providers, and other private partners
to advance the objections outlined in subsection (b).
(i) Partner Disqualification.--
(1) Prohibition on the use of funds.--No funds shall be
made available under this Act to--
(A) a foreign country of concern; or
(B) any country, entity, or person--
(i) upon which sanctions are imposed by the
United States Department of the Treasury; or
(ii) that is an entity or person on the
Entity List maintained by the Bureau of
Industry and Security of the Department of
Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to
part 744 of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations.
(2) Vetting.--The Secretary of State shall vet foreign
government partners to determine whether there is credible
information that such partner--
(A) has committed serious human rights abuses or
engaged in corruption, as defined by section 1 of
Executive Order 13818 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking the property of persons involved in serious
human rights abuse or corruption), or is determined to
be ineligible for assistance pursuant to section 620M
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2378d); and
(B) uses or is likely to use technologies outlined
in subsection (c) and supported by this Act to engage
in--
(i) violations of human rights;
(ii) targeted or bulk surveillance in
violation of rule of law principles or
fundamental freedoms;
(iii) the monitoring of journalists,
activists, human rights defenders, opposition
parties, or political dissidents;
(iv) internet shutdowns or to limit or
control elections or protests;
(v) political censorship or the targeting
and suppression of political speech or
political opponents;
(vi) denial of access to technology or
services based on race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, or other discriminatory factors; and
(vii) acts of transnational repression.
(3) Disqualification.--Any foreign government partner
determined by the Secretary of State to engage in the