[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6646 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 6646

  To promote transparency and accountability in covered digital labor 
                 platform work, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 11, 2025

Ms. Jayapal (for herself, Mr. Norcross, Ms. Omar, Mr. Goldman of Texas, 
   Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania, Mrs. McIver, Ms. Norton, Mr. Pocan, Mr. 
    Takano, and Ms. Tlaib) introduced the following bill; which was 
          referred to the Committee on Education and Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To promote transparency and accountability in covered digital labor 
                 platform work, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Empowering App-Based Workers Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Millions of workers in the United States report to work 
        by logging on to digital labor platforms: software applications 
        (commonly known as ``apps'') that allocate and manage work.
            (2) Businesses are using digital labor platforms in a wide 
        and growing range of industries and occupations in the United 
        States. While the most well-known businesses using digital 
        labor platforms provide ride-hail and last-mile delivery 
        services, businesses in a variety of sectors, including large- 
        and low-paid sectors like retail, hospitality, warehousing, and 
        food services, increasingly manage labor via digital labor 
        platforms.
            (3) Platformed, or app-based, workers of all ages and every 
        race, ethnicity, gender, and immigration status can be found in 
        every State. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, app-
        based workers are disproportionately people of color, 
        comprising approximately 42 percent of the app-based workforce, 
        compared to 29 percent of the overall workforce. A 2021 Pew 
        Research poll of United States workers found that women (17 
        percent) were more likely than men (15 percent) to report that 
        they had ever done app-based work. The growing workforces of 
        businesses that use digital labor platforms to manage delivery 
        workers are majority women. Platform work is growing in 
        industries like retail, hospitality, warehousing, and food 
        services, in which people of color are overrepresented.
            (4) Government and academic research has found that app-
        based workers often receive poverty wages and few to no 
        benefits and are subject to wage theft and wage and employment 
        discrimination. A 2024 University of California at Berkeley 
        study of app-based ride-hail drivers in 5 metropolitan areas 
        found that a majority of drivers earn net pay that is 
        significantly less than the applicable minimum wage. Job 
        quality issues may be related to the frequent misclassification 
        of app-based workers as independent contractors who lack 
        employment-based rights and protections. Indeed, both courts 
        and regulatory agencies have found businesses that use digital 
        labor platforms to have misclassified employees as independent 
        contractors, stolen wages, and withheld benefits.
            (5) Research also shows that some businesses that use 
        digital labor platforms may be engaging in discriminatory 
        pricing practices, charging variable rates for the same 
        services based on particular characteristics of a consumer, and 
        setting personalized wages for the same work based on 
        characteristics of a worker.
            (6) Businesses use digital labor platforms to determine 
        access by an app-based worker to work assignments, the pay for 
        the assignments, and the prices charged to customers. Such 
        platforms often use electronic monitoring tools and automated 
        decision-making systems or algorithms, fed by a variety of 
        inputs, including data derived from workers and consumers.
            (7) The use of electronic monitoring tools and automated 
        decision-making systems is not exclusive to businesses that use 
        digital labor platforms. Other kinds of businesses do use them 
        but the heavy reliance by such businesses on these systems to 
        interface with workers and consumers is unique.
            (8) But while the electronic monitoring tools and automated 
        decision-making systems of businesses that use digital labor 
        platforms dictate the experience of workers and consumers on 
        digital labor platforms, their presence, purpose, and mechanics 
        are, too often, wholly opaque to workers, consumers, voters, 
        and policymakers. This opacity creates profound information 
        asymmetries between these groups and the corporations that own 
        or operate digital labor platforms.
            (9) The lack of information about the electronic monitoring 
        tools and automated decision-making systems used by businesses 
        that use digital labor platforms prevents workers, consumers, 
        and policymakers from understanding whether and to what extent 
        these systems are generating harms and facilitating the 
        violation of existing laws and regulations.
            (10) Unaccountable pay algorithms can enable various forms 
        of wage theft, such as minimum wage violations, tip-stealing, 
        routine undercounting of worktime, and illegal fees and 
        deductions, as well as discrimination based on protected class. 
        Forms of employer control obscured by algorithmic management 
        can enable independent contractor misclassification and create 
        insurmountable roadblocks to app-based workers' ability to 
        access minimum wage and overtime pay for all time worked, paid 
        sick leave, unemployment insurance benefits, workers' 
        compensation, protections from discrimination, and more.
            (11) Reliance on electronic monitoring tools and automated 
        decision-making systems that hide control and enable 
        misclassification of employees as independent contractors also 
        has profound implications for social welfare programs and 
        competing businesses. Businesses that misclassify employees as 
        independent contractors neglect to pay their share of employer 
        contributions for programs such as unemployment insurance and 
        social security. In total, a misclassifying business can save 
        up to 30 percent of its payroll costs by mislabeling a worker 
        as an independent contractor, which disadvantages responsible 
        employers.
            (12) The lack of transparency around pricing algorithms 
        allows businesses that use digital labor platforms to raise 
        prices on consumers under the guise of increasing labor and 
        regulatory costs. Businesses that use digital labor platforms 
        may use opaque pricing algorithms to determine the amount they 
        charge to customers for a service, as well as the share of that 
        fee that those businesses keep for themselves compared to the 
        share that goes to the app-based workers who provide the 
        service. The variable and opaque share of the consumer charge 
        that certain digital labor platform providers keep, versus the 
        share they pay an app-based workers (the ``take rate'') is 
        concerning.
            (13) The issue of fluctuating, opaque, and predatory take 
        rates is especially pronounced in the ride-hail industry, a 
        pioneer in the use of digital labor platforms. Initially, ride-
        hail companies paid app-based workers 90 percent of the 
        consumer charge, decreasing it to 80 percent as they attracted 
        more workers. Early take rates of 10 to 20 percent were styled 
        as ``service fees'' that drivers paid to access work through 
        the digital labor platform. Like commissions, if the ride-hail 
        companies increased their prices, workers likewise received a 
        raise.
            (14) Ride-hail companies later abandoned their commission-
        based service fee, and now set consumer prices independently of 
        app-based worker pay. Both prices and pay are largely 
        influenced by unaccountable hidden algorithms and automated 
        decision systems. They are also influenced by individualized 
        consumer and worker characteristics that offend notions of 
        equal pay for equal work and fair dealing.
            (15) App-based workers now report ride-hail companies 
        taking as much as 60 percent of the fare. A PowerSwitch Action 
        analysis of Uber fares in New York City and Chicago between 
        2019 and 2023 found that driver pay declined even as fares 
        charged to consumers increased because Uber's take rate also 
        increased.
            (16) Rising, unpredictable take rates and lower pay have 
        made ride-hail work an increasingly losing proposition. Workers 
        who provide what has become a growing and crucial 
        transportation service are entitled to transparent, consistent, 
        and fair pay for their work. A 25 percent cap on take rates in 
        the ride-hail industry will limit the most exploitative 
        algorithmic practices and help ensure the health and well-being 
        of more than a million U.S. workers. Since expenses and the 
        cost of living vary from market to market, the take rate cap in 
        this Act establishes a floor, not a ceiling, and does not 
        preempt any state or local efforts to establish take rate 
        standards that exceed that set forth herein.
            (17) Although the ride-hail industry has been an early 
        adopter of digital labor platform technologies, the public 
        needs to understand how all businesses that use digital labor 
        platforms utilize electronic monitoring tools and automated 
        decision-making systems so they may understand how this 
        unaccountable technology affects their lives. Without 
        transparency requirements around their use of electronic 
        monitoring tools and automated decision-making systems, 
        businesses that use digital labor platforms can exploit 
        information asymmetries to make false and unverifiable claims 
        about the potential impacts of proposed and existing public 
        policies.
            (18) Policymakers outside the United States have taken 
        steps to ensure that platforms operate with more transparency 
        and accountability. Multinational corporations like Amazon, 
        Uber, and DoorDash will soon be subject to various transparency 
        and reporting requirements in the European Union as countries 
        come into compliance with the European Union Platform Work 
        Directive. The United States must not be a global laggard when 
        it comes to platform regulation; workers, consumers, and the 
        public will suffer for it.
            (19) To ensure that app-based work is not an engine of 
        poverty and racial inequality that places downward pressure on 
        job quality across the economy, workers, consumers, 
        policymakers, and regulators must not be left in the dark about 
        the surveillance and labor management technologies that 
        businesses that use digital labor platforms are using.
            (20) All workers, businesses, and consumers in the United 
        States, stand to benefit from the establishment of clear rules 
        requiring transparency and accountability around the use of 
        electronic monitoring and automated decision-making systems by 
        businesses that use digital labor platforms to manage work.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Adverse action.--The term ``adverse action'' means an 
        action taken by a covered digital labor platform provider with 
        respect to an app-based worker that a reasonable person would 
        find negatively impacts the app-based worker's access to or 
        terms, conditions, or privileges of work, including fewer (by 
        volume or frequency) or less favorable work assignments or 
        offers, less or unfavorable hours or shifts, reduced access to 
        bonuses, incentives, or other benefits, temporary, permanent, 
        or indefinite suspension, deactivation or termination, 
        restriction of access to the platform, failure to promote, 
        failure to pay, and reductions in pay.
            (2) Aggregated app-based worker data.--The term 
        ``aggregated app-based worker data'' means data with respect to 
        multiple app-based workers that is combined or collected 
        together in a summary or other form that prevents the 
        identification of any specific app-based worker.
            (3) App-based worker.--The term ``app-based worker'', with 
        respect to a covered digital labor platform provider, means an 
        individual who performs work or provides services for 
        remuneration on or through the covered digital labor platform 
        of the covered digital labor platform provider, regardless of 
        whether the individual is compensated by the covered digital 
        labor platform provider or another person.
            (4) Applicant.--The term ``applicant'', with respect to a 
        covered digital labor platform, means an individual who has 
        signed up for, applied for, activated, or created an account in 
        order to provide services on or through the covered digital 
        labor platform of a covered digital labor platform provider as 
        an app-based worker but has not yet been approved for or 
        offered work through the covered digital labor platform.
            (5) Attribute.--The term ``attribute'' includes, as 
        applicable, the tenure, demographics, reviews, acceptance rate, 
        part-time status, average weekly hours, and location of an app-
        based worker.
            (6) Authorized agent.--The term ``authorized agent'' means 
        a person (other than a covered digital labor platform provider 
        or a vendor or affiliated person of the provider) that an app-
        based worker has authorized to receive disclosures from a 
        covered digital labor platform in accordance with section 7, 
        including a labor organization.
            (7) Automated decision system.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``automated decision 
                system'' means any tool, software, system, process, 
                function, program, method, model, or formula using, or 
                designed with, computation to issue an automated 
                decision system output that is used to augment, assist, 
                or replace human judgment, decision making, or policy 
                implementation.
                    (B) Exclusions.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), 
                the term ``automated decision system'' does not include 
                any spam email filter, firewall, antivirus software, 
                calculator, database, dataset, or other compilation of 
                data.
            (8) Automated decision system output.--The term ``automated 
        decision system output'' means any information, data, 
        assumption, prediction, scoring, classification, 
        recommendation, decision, or conclusion generated by an 
        automated decision system.
            (9) Commerce; person.--The terms ``commerce'' and 
        ``person'' have the meanings given the terms in section 3 of 
        the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203).
            (10) Covered digital labor platform.--
                    (A) In general.--The term ``covered digital labor 
                platform'' means a platform provided, offered, or used 
                by a covered digital labor platform provider that--
                            (i) is provided, at least in part, through 
                        electronic means such as an online-enabled 
                        application, internet site, or mobile 
                        application;
                            (ii) provides services performed by an app-
                        based worker at the request of a consumer;
                            (iii) involves the facilitation of work to 
                        be performed by an individual in exchange for 
                        payment, regardless of whether such work is 
                        performed online or in a certain geographic 
                        location; and
                            (iv) involves the use of an automated 
                        decision-making system or electronic monitoring 
                        tool.
                    (B) Exclusions.--
                            (i) In general.--Notwithstanding 
                        subparagraph (A), the term ``covered digital 
                        labor platform'' does not include--
                                    (I) any platform that--
                                            (aa) only provides the 
                                        means by which service 
                                        providers can reach an end-
                                        user, customer, or recipient, 
                                        without involvement of the 
                                        platform in the terms or 
                                        conditions of the work; or
                                            (bb) only organizes the 
                                        activities of volunteers; or
                                    (II) any platform that has the 
                                primary purpose of exploiting or 
                                sharing real property assets for short-
                                term accommodations or that allows an 
                                individual who is not a professional to 
                                resell goods.
                            (ii) Burden of proof.--A person providing, 
                        offering, or using a platform that the person 
                        believes is a platform described in subclause 
                        (I) or (II) shall have the burden of proof to 
                        establish that the platform is a platform 
                        described in such a subclause for purposes of 
                        any enforcement activity taken under section 9.
            (11) Covered digital labor platform provider.--The term 
        ``covered digital labor platform provider''--
                    (A) means a person engaged in commerce or an 
                industry affecting commerce that employs an app-based 
                worker to perform work or provide services for 
                remuneration on or through the covered digital labor 
                platform of the person, or that otherwise engages, 
                arranges, or facilitates the performance of such work 
                or provision of such services, regardless of whethe