[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3208 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3208
To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of
the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 19, 2025
Mr. Curtis (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of
the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Six Assurances to Taiwan Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of more than
23,000,000 people and an important economic partner to the
United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has long sought to
subjugate Taiwan and has not renounced the use of force to do
so.
(3) The United States longstanding One-China Policy, which
is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), the
three United States-China Joint Communiques, and the Six
Assurances, has guided United States-Taiwan relations across
successive administrations and contributed to peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific.
(4) From July to August 1982, before and immediately after
the release of the United States-China Joint Communique on
United States Arms Sales to Taiwan (``the 1982 Joint
Communique'') on August 17, 1982, the Reagan Administration
articulated six key foreign policy principles regarding United
States-Taiwan relations.
(5) On July 10, 1982, then-Under Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to James Lilley, then-
director of the American Institute in Taiwan, detailing what
the United States had not agreed to in its negotiations with
the People's Republic of China over the 1982 Joint Communique.
He wrote--
(A) ``We have not agreed to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan.'';
(B) ``We have not agreed to prior consultation on
arms sales.'';
(C) ``We have not agreed to any mediation role for
the U.S.'';
(D) ``We have not agreed to revise the Taiwan
Relations Act.'';
(E) ``We have not agreed to take any position
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.''; and
(F) ``The PRC has at no time urged us to put
pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC; however,
we can assure you that we will never do so''.
(6) On August 17, 1982, then-Secretary of State George
Shultz provided Lilley with a version of the Six Assurances for
Taiwan's government to release, stating that the United
States--
(A) ``has not agreed to set a date for ending arms
sales to Taiwan'';
(B) ``has not agreed to consult with the PRC on
arms sales to Taiwan'';
(C) ``will not play any mediation role between
Taipei and Beijing'';
(D) ``has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations
Act'';
(E) ``has not altered its position regarding
sovereignty over Taiwan''; and
(F) ``will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter
into negotiations with the PRC''.
(7) On August 17, 1982, then-Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge testified
on behalf of the executive branch before the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate about the 1982 Joint Communique
that--
(A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan.'';
(B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be
read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior
consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.'';
(C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United
States.'';
(D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions
[to the Taiwan Relations Act].'';
(E) ``[T]here has been no change in our
longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over
Taiwan.''; and
(F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.''.
(8) On August 18, 1982, Holdridge testified on behalf of
the executive branch before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs about the 1982 Joint Communique that--
(A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan.'';
(B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be
read that we have agreed to engage in prior
consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.'';
(C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United
States.'';
(D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions
[to the Taiwan Relations Act].'';
(E) ``[T]here has been no change in our
longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over
Taiwan.''; and
(F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's
Republic of China.''.
(9) These six foreign policy principles, as articulated by
Eagleburger, Shultz, and Holdridge, have collectively come to
be known as the Six Assurances.
(10) Section 1269D of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 1681)
and section 1258 of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132
Stat. 2058) each state that it is the sense of Congress that
the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances ``are both
cornerstones'' of United States-Taiwan relations.
(11) Section 209 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
2018 (Public Law 115-409; 22 U.S.C. 3301 note) states that it
is United States policy for the United States to enforce
existing United States Government commitments to Taiwan,
``consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law
96-8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six Assurances''.
(12) Section 1259 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 22 U.S.C. 3301 note)
states that it is United States policy for the United States
``to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan
Relations Act and consistent with the `Six Assurances'''.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the maintenance of peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait are in the political, security, and economic
interests of the United States, and are matters of
international concern;
(2) any unilateral change to the status quo from either
side or negotiated settlement of the question of Taiwan's
status without the consent of both sides of the Strait is
unacceptable;
(3) the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful
means; and
(4) the maintenance of the Six Assurances constitutes a
stabilizing and necessary component of the United States policy
toward Taiwan.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to reaffirm that, in the
context of the 1982 Joint Communique, the United States--
(1) did not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to
Taiwan;
(2) did not agree to consult with the People's Republic of
China on arms sales to Taiwan;
(3) did not and will not agree to play any mediation role;
(4) did not agree to seek to revise the Taiwan Relations
Act;
(5) did not take any position regarding the issue of
sovereignty over Taiwan; and
(6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into
negotiations with the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO THE SIX
ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN.
(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a notification that describes the
proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described.--An action described in this
paragraph is an action--
(A) to pause or terminate the provision of arms of
a defensive character to Taiwan;
(B) to negotiate with the People's Republic of
China about the provision of arms of a defensive
character to Taiwan;
(C) to mediate between Taiwan and the People's
Republic of China regarding the issue of sovereignty
over Taiwan;
(D) to change the United States longstanding
position on the issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan;
or
(E) to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into
negotiations with the People's Republic of China.
(3) Description of type of action.--Each notification
submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action
described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of
whether the action is or is not intended to significantly alter
United States foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the
People's Republic of China.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter.--Each notification
submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with respect to Taiwan or the People's Republic of China shall
include a description of--
(A) the significant alteration to United States
foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the People's
Republic of China;
(B) the anticipated effect of the action on the
economic and national security interests of the United
States; and
(C) the anticipated effect of the action on the
issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan.
(b) Period for Review by Congress.--
(1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days
beginning on the date on which the President submits a
notification under subsection (a)(1), the appropriate
congressional committees should hold hearings and briefings and
otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the
notification.
(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) of a notification required to be submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the notification
is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7
in any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
during the period for congressional review provided for under
paragraph (1) of a notification submitted under subsection
(a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2),
including any additional period for such review as applicable
under the exception provided in paragraph (2), neither the
President nor any other officer or employee of the United
States may take that action or expend any appropriated funds in
furtherance of that action unless a joint resolution of
approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance
with subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration
of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval
relating to a notification submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both
Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), neither
the President nor any other officer or employee of the United
States may take that action or expend any appropriated funds in
furtherance of that action for a period of 12 calendar days
after the date of passage of the joint resolution of
disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint
resolution of disapproval relating to a notification submitted
under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance
with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint
resolution, neither the President nor any other officer or
employee of the United States may take that action or expend
any appropriated funds in furtherance of that action for a
period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's
veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a
joint resolution of disapproval relating to a notification
submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described
in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection
(c), neither the President nor any other officer or employee of
the United States may take that action or expend any
appropriated funds in furtherance of that action.
(c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint
resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution
of either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A
joint resolution approving the President's
proposal to take an action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving
clause of which is the following: ``Congress
approves of the action relating to the action
with respect to the Six Assurances to Taiwan
proposed by the President in the notification
submitted to Congress under section 2(a)(1) of
the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act on _______
relating to ________.'', with the first blank
space being filled with the appropriate date
and the second blank space being filled with a
short description of the proposed action.
(B) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term
``joint resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint
resolution of either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A
joint resolution disapproving the President's
proposal to take an action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving
clause of which is the following: ``Congress
disapproves of the action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan proposed by the President
in the notification submitted to Congress under
section 2(a)(1) of the Six Assurances to Taiwan
Act on _______ relating to ________.'', with
the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space
being filled with a short description of the
proposed action.
(2) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days
provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional
period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection
(b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval may be introduced--
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the
majority leader or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the
majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or
the minority leader's designee).
(3) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If
the appropriate congressional committee of the House of
Representatives has not reported the joint resolution within 10
legislative days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(4) Consideration in the senate.--
(A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced
in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to
which a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported
the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the
date of referral of the joint resolution, that
committee shall be discharged from further
consideration of the joint resolution and the joint
resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding
Rule XXII of the Standing