[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5274 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5274
To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 10, 2025
Mr. Keating (for himself, Ms. Malliotakis, and Mr. Goldman of New York)
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for
a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States
and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Balkans
Democracy and Prosperity Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans.
Sec. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives.
Sec. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement.
Sec. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans.
Sec. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western
Balkans.
Sec. 11. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement.
Sec. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and
campaigns in the Western Balkans.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic
of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the
Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in
the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability,
and prosperity of that continent.
(2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the
Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for
democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens
and residents of those seven countries.
(3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and
the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable
and sustainable economic growth and development in the region.
(4) The reforms and integration with the European Union
pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to
significant democratic and economic progress in the region.
(5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and
unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in
neighboring European Union countries.
(6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting
demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in
population decline in all seven countries.
(7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms
could help enable investment and employment opportunities in
the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide
powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging
broader participation in a political process that increases
trade and prosperity for all.
(8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common
Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan
Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic
conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion
and transparency.
(9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign
Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and
facilitating opportunities for United States trade and
investment.
(10) Corruption, including among key political leaders,
continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of
the greatest impediments to further economic and political
development in the region.
(11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans
undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions,
including the integrity of its elections.
(12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on
information and communication technology infrastructure
increases risks to the functioning of government and the
delivery of public services.
(13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State,
and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending
the national security interests of the United States, including
by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner
nations to reinforce their cyber defenses.
(14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and
ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the
United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs
across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity.
(15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political
environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict.
(16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and
natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their
economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits
their aspirations for European integration.
(17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on
Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the
national interest of the United States.
(18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans
could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition,
democracy, and economic integration with Europe.
(19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European
Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic
resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human
rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia's war
of aggression.
(20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia
on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause
for deep concern about the State of Serbia's democracy,
including due to the final report of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, which--
(A) found ``unjust conditions'' for the election;
(B) found ``numerous procedural deficiencies,
including inconsistent application of safeguards during
voting and counting, frequent instances of
overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and
numerous instances of group voting''; and
(C) asserted that ``voting must be repeated'' in
certain polling stations.
(21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily
peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of
``attempting to destabilize the government'', a concerning
allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of
Serbian society.
(22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment
with the United States make for stronger and more durable
partnerships.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is a sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) encourage increased trade and investment between the
United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans;
(2) expand United States assistance to regional integration
efforts in the Western Balkans;
(3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in
the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and
employing women and youth;
(4) work with allies and partners committed to improving
the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic
and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the
Western Balkans;
(5) increase United States trade and investment with the
Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries'
efforts--
(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy
sources and fossil fuels;
(B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency,
and conservation; and
(C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and
more reliable sources of energy, including renewables,
as appropriate;
(6) continue to assist in the development, within the
Western Balkans, of--
(A) strong civil societies;
(B) public-private partnerships;
(C) independent media;
(D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive
governance, including equal representation for women
and youth;
(E) political stability; and
(F) modern, free-market based economies;
(7) support the expeditious accession of those Western
Balkans countries that are not already members to the European
Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred
to in this section as ``NATO'') for countries that desire and
are eligible for such membership;
(8) support--
(A) maintaining the full European Union Force
(EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in
the national security interests of the United States;
(B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to
review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role
in establishing a safe and secure environment,
particularly in the realm of defense;
(C) working within NATO to encourage contingency
planning for an international military force to
maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks
reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations;
and
(D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo;
(9) continue to support the European Union membership
aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the
benchmarks required for their accession;
(10) continue to support the overarching mission of the
Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are
inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned
with the objectives and standards laid out by the European
Union as requirements for accession to the European Union;
(11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and
recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans;
(12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United
Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions
designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align
efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment
to upholding democratic values;
(13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO
member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused
on regional integration and cooperation, including through the
Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003;
(14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence
campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities
targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with
government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists,
civil society organizations, and industry leaders;
(15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards,
consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness
Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with
partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on
cybersecurity and ICT infrastructure;
(16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States
commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for
international law as the sole path forward for the countries of
the Western Balkans; and
(17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western
Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward
strengthening their democracies and show respect for human
rights.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) ICT.--The term ``ICT'' means information and
communication technology.
(3) Western balkans.--The term ``Western Balkans'' means
the region comprised of the following countries:
(A) The Republic of Albania.
(B) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(C) The Republic of Croatia.
(D) The Republic of Kosovo.
(E) Montenegro.
(F) The Republic of North Macedonia.
(G) The Republic of Serbia.
(4) Western balkans country.--The term ``Western Balkans
country'' means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through
(G) of paragraph (3).
SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE WESTERN BALKANS.
(a) In General.--Each person listed or designated for the
imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in
subsection (c) as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain
so designated, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e).
(b) Continuation of Sanctions Authorities.--Each authority to
impose sanctions provided for under an executive order described in
subsection (c) shall remain in effect.
(c) Executive Orders Specified.--The executive orders specified in
this subsection are--
(1) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order
13304 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of
persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the
Western Balkans); and
(2) Executive Order 14033 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property and suspending entry into the United States
of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation
in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of
enactment.
(d) Termination of Sanctions.--The President may terminate the
application of a sanction described in subsection (a) with respect to a
person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that such person--
(1) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for
such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period
immediately preceding such termination date; or
(2) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the
basis for such sanctions.
(e) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to
exceed 180 days if the President--
(A) determines that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States; and
(B) not less than 15 days before the granting of
the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional
committees a notice of and justification for the
waiver.
(2) Form.--The waiver described in paragraph (1) may be
transmitted in classified form.
(f) Exceptions.--
(1) Humanitarian assistance.--Sanctions under this Act
shall not apply to--
(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction
for the provision of agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or
for humanitarian purposes; or
(B) transactions that are necessary for, or related
to, the activities described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Compliance with international obligations and law
enforcement activities.--Sanctions under this Act shall not
apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such
alien is necessary--
(A) to comply with United States obligations
under--
(i) the Agreement between the United
Nations and the United States of America
regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947;
(ii) the Convention on Consular Relations,
done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into
force March 19, 1967; or
(iii) any other international agreement; or
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity
in the United States.
(3) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this Act shall not apply to--
(A) any activity subject to the reporting
requirements under title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or
(B) any authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
(4) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The requirement to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property under this Act shall not include the
authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the