[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2592 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2592
To provide emergency supplemental appropriations in response to the
crisis in Ukraine, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 31, 2025
Mrs. Shaheen (for herself and Ms. Murkowski) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide emergency supplemental appropriations in response to the
crisis in Ukraine, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Supporting Ukraine
Act of 2025''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--PROVISIONS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE'S WAR EFFORT
Sec. 101. Sense of Congress regarding security assistance for Ukraine.
Sec. 102. Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.
Sec. 103. Seizure of illicit weapons transfers for the benefit of
Ukraine.
Sec. 104. Supplementing United States assistance for Ukraine through
the use of immobilized Russian sovereign
assets.
Sec. 105. Sense of Congress welcoming President Trump's commitment to
sell weapons to NATO allies for Ukraine.
Sec. 106. Supporting Ukraine by holding corrupt Russian oligarchs
accountable.
TITLE II--SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR UKRAINE
Sec. 201. Emergency appropriations for Department of Defense assistance
to Ukraine.
Sec. 202. Emergency appropriations to the Department of State for
international disaster assistance.
Sec. 203. Foreign Military Financing Program.
Sec. 204. Emergency designation.
Sec. 205. Presidential Drawdown Authority for Ukraine.
Sec. 206. Support for Ukraine rule of law, governance, and justice for
war crimes.
TITLE III--ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF UKRAINE
Sec. 301. Trilateral cooperation initiative with Ukraine and Taiwan
involving unmanned air, marine, and
underwater defense systems.
Sec. 302. Establishment of Ukraine Lessons Learned Task Force.
Sec. 303. Acceptance back into stock of equipment procured under
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.
Sec. 304. Intelligence support for Ukraine.
Sec. 305. International security cooperation program funding for United
States European Command.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Vladimir Putin has demonstrated his intent to continue
his war of aggression against Ukraine, including through
violating ceasefires over the last decade, laying out
maximalist demands, employing stall tactics, and repeatedly
firing weapons into civilian areas;
(2) the Russian Federation poses a threat beyond Ukraine,
with Russian Government officials stating territorial ambitions
in Poland and in the Baltic States, and carrying out acts of
hybrid war, including sabotage and assassinations, across the
NATO Alliance and in partner nations;
(3) since 2014, the United States has stood firmly with
Ukraine in its defense of its territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and democratic character, and has reaffirmed this
commitment following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022;
(4) continued support for Ukraine serves vital national
security interests of the United States by helping to uphold
international law, deter aggression, and promote stability in
Europe and around the world;
(5) since 2014, and particularly following Russia's full-
scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ukraine has employed
adaptive, innovative, and asymmetric defense strategies to
resist aggression from the Russian Federation;
(6) the United States has a compelling national interest in
learning from partners' combat experience to inform its own
defense strategies, procurement processes, and military
doctrine;
(7) Ukraine's adaptive and resourceful defense strategies,
particularly its use of emerging technologies, unmanned
systems, cyber defense, and decentralized operations, have
yielded critical insights into modern warfare, and have
directly informed United States military research, development,
and doctrine;
(8) such innovations are directly relevant to deterring and
responding to potential aggression in the Indo-Pacific region;
(9) the lessons learned in Ukraine's defense against
Russia's aggression should be immediately and directly applied
to deterring aggression by foreign adversaries, including the
People's Republic of China, and where possible, bilateral and
multilateral initiatives to build upon these innovations should
be encouraged and sponsored;
(10) initiatives, such as Operation Spiderweb, have exposed
potential vulnerabilities within United States and allied
defense systems, and have offered valuable opportunities to
enhance readiness;
(11) lessons learned from Ukraine's experience may help the
United States identify vulnerabilities, improve resilience, and
enhance innovation in its own defense posture;
(12) the People's Republic of China is watching the extent
to which the United States continues to vigorously support and
provide military assistance to Ukraine in its defense against
Russian aggression and to evaluate the practical strength of
the United States commitment to deterring potential aggression
in the Indo-Pacific region;
(13) what the United States does or does not do to support
Ukraine could directly influence the People's Republic of
China's calculus with respect to its own territorial
aspirations;
(14) while there can only be a diplomatic resolution to
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, decreasing or
ceasing United States military and financial support to Ukraine
would only strengthen Vladimir Putin's bargaining power in such
negotiations by weakening Ukraine's position on the
battlefield;
(15) demonstrating the United States resolve in support of
Ukraine is the only way to force Vladimir Putin to negotiate
seriously to end the war on fair and equitable terms; and
(16) it is therefore in the vital national security
interest of the United States to continue strategic investments
in Ukraine's defenses in order to strengthen the defenses of
the United States and its allies to advance President Trump's
``Peace through Strength'' agenda.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Russian aggressor state sovereign asset.--The term
``Russian aggressor state sovereign asset'' has the meaning
given such term in section 2 of the REPO for Ukrainians Act
(division F of Public Law 118-50; 22 U.S.C. 9521 note).
TITLE I--PROVISIONS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE'S WAR EFFORT
SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the provision of United States security assistance is
mutually beneficial to Ukraine and the national security
interests of the United States;
(2) the procurement of security assistance for Ukraine
helps spur manufacturing necessary to prepare for other United
States military contingencies, including in the Indo-Pacific,
while also countering and deterring adversaries of the United
States;
(3) appropriations by Congress provide a demand signal for
industry to continue to support the needs of the United States
and our allies;
(4) United States assistance to Ukraine is not charity, but
must be given in coordination with contributions from other
sources; and
(5) the United States should use all available sources
available to continue its support for Ukraine, including--
(A) using United States funds to backfill and
procure United States assistance for Ukraine;
(B) leveraging Russian assets that are frozen in
the United States to benefit Ukraine;
(C) seizing illicit weapons transfers around the
globe to benefit Ukraine;
(D) capitalizing the Ukraine Reconstruction
Investment Fund through the provision of security
assistance and generating future returns for taxpayers;
and
(E) selling needed arms and other materiel to
allies that are willing to provide such items to
Ukraine.
SEC. 102. UNITED STATES-UKRAINE RECONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT FUND.
(a) Authorization of the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction
Investment Fund.--The United States International Development Finance
Corporation is authorized to implement the Agreement between the
Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of
America on the Establishment of a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction
Investment Fund, done at Washington April 30, 2025 (commonly known as
the ``Ukraine-United States Mineral Resources Agreement'').
(b) Contributions to the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction
Investment Fund.--Security assistance provided by the United States to
Ukraine, including assistance provided pursuant to this Act, shall,
consistent with the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the
Government of the United States of America on the Establishment of a
United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, done at
Washington April 30, 2025 (commonly known as the ``Ukraine-United
States Mineral Resources Agreement''), be taken into account towards
the United States capital contributions for the Ukraine Reconstruction
Investment Fund, consistent with section 5 of Article VI of the
agreement, which states ``If, after the Effective Date, the Government
of the United States of America delivers new military assistance to the
Government of Ukraine in any form (including the donation of weapons
systems, ammunition, technology or training), the capital contribution
of the U.S. Partner will be deemed to be increased by the assessed
value of such military assistance, in accordance with the LP
Agreement.''.
(c) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 2 years, the President shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees describing the capital
contributions of the United States, including the donation of
any weapon systems and other materiel or items that increased
the capital contributions of the United States.
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 103. SEIZURE OF ILLICIT WEAPONS TRANSFERS FOR THE BENEFIT OF
UKRAINE.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States to work to
provide, consistent with applicable Federal law, weapons systems and
components seized from sanctioned Iranian entities to the Government of
Ukraine for use in its war against the Russian Federation.
(b) Information Sharing.--The Department of Defense and other
relevant Federal agencies shall seek to provide information to the
Department of Justice that is relevant to a potential forfeiture action
of any weapons systems or components seized from sanctioned Iranian
entities that could have utility for Ukraine in its war against Russia.
(c) Transfers Authorized.--The Attorney General, in coordination
with the Secretary of State and other relevant Federal agencies, shall
seek to transfer any items described in subsection (b) that are needed
by Ukraine to the Government of Ukraine or the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
(d) Surplus Items.--If the Secretary of Defense determines, after
consultation with the Government of Ukraine and the Commander of the
United States European Command, that certain items are not needed or
usable by Ukraine, the Secretary may sell such items as surplus in
accordance with existing law and reserve the proceeds from such sales
for the purposes of supporting Ukraine.
(e) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives that--
(A) details the use of the authority described in
this section; and
(B) identifies any seized weapons or items provided
to Ukraine and any proceeds from the sale of such items
that was used to support Ukraine.
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 104. SUPPLEMENTING UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE THROUGH
THE USE OF IMMOBILIZED RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSETS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) effectuate the seizure, confiscation, transferral, or
vesting of Russian aggressor state sovereign assets subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, in whole or part,
including any interest earned on such assets, and transfer such
assets to the Ukraine Support Fund pursuant to subsections
(b)(2)-(3) and (d) of section 104 of the REPO for Ukrainians
Act (division F of Public Law 118-50; 22 U.S.C. 9521 note); or
(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives a strategy for raising additional revenue from
Russian aggressor state sovereign assets subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, including through the
reinvestment of such assets in asset classes with greater
potential to produce revenue or through the taxation of the
income of such assets.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)(2) shall
include--
(1) a proposed plan for reinvesting immobilized Russian
sovereign assets, including--
(A) a description of the advantages and
disadvantages of investing in different asset classes,
including equities; and
(B) a projection of the potential for raising
revenue under various investment scenarios and
timelines;
(2) a proposal for taxing the income of immobilized Russian
aggressor state sovereign assets;
(3) any other proposal to raise revenue from immobilized
Russian aggressor state sovereign assets subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and an estimate of the amount
of revenue to be so raised;
(4) a timeline and plan for the implementation of the
preferred method for raising revenue; and
(5) a plan for utilizing the amounts generated by such
additional revenue for the benefit of Ukraine, including by
procuring and providing new security assistance for Ukraine.
(c) Report.--Not later than 30 days following the submission of a
strategy pursuant to subsection (a)(2), and every 180 days thereafter
for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House of Representatives a report that describes--
(1) the revenue generated as a result of the approach
recommended by the strategy;
(2) any additional steps the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of the Treasury intend to take to generate additional
revenue from immobilized Russian assets; and
(3) how any revenue generated from the implementation of
the strategy has been used to support Ukraine.
(d) Expanded Use of Ukraine Support Fund.--Section 104(f)(2) of the
REPO for Ukrainians Act (division F of Public Law 118-50 (22 U.S.C.
2951 note)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(D) Procuring weapons intended to be transferred
to Ukraine.
``(E) Backfilling weapons provided to Ukraine
through the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority
under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318 (a)).''.
SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS WELCOMING PRESIDENT TRUMP'S COMMITMENT TO
SELL WEAPONS TO NATO ALLIES FOR UKRAINE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the July 14, 2025, announcement by President Donald
Trump and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General
Mark Rutte that NATO will coordinate funding from allies in
Europe and Canada to procure United States origin weapons for
Ukraine is a welcome development;
(2) the commitment by NATO allies to purchase United States
origin weapons--
(A) demonstrates meaningful burden sharing between
allies in Euro-Atlantic support for Ukraine;
(B) builds upon the $180,000,000,000 that the
European Union has made available to Ukraine since
February 2022, including $65,000,000,000 in military
assistance; and
(C) provides additional