[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4107 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 4107
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 24, 2025
Mr. Messmer (for himself, Mr. Fallon, Mr. Harrigan, Mr. Wittman, Mr.
Crenshaw, Mr. McCormick, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Bergman, Mr.
Luttrell, Mr. Jackson of Texas, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Van Orden, Mr. Yakym,
Mr. Finstad, Mr. Mast, Mr. Shreve, Mr. McDowell, Mr. Baird, Mr. Hamadeh
of Arizona, Mr. Mills, Mr. Steube, Mrs. Houchin, Mr. Begich, Mr.
Gimenez, and Mr. Stutzman) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the
Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, and Transportation and
Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve the missile defense capabilities of the United States, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Ground and Orbital Launched Defeat
of Emergent Nuclear Destruction and Other Missile Engagements Act of
2025'' or the ``GOLDEN DOME Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--
(1) Missile defense review.--Congress finds that the 2022
Missile Defense Review found the following:
(A) Since the release of the 2019 Missile Defense
Review, missile-related threats have rapidly expanded
in quantity, diversity, and sophistication.
(B) United States national security interests are
increasingly at risk from wide-ranging missile arsenals
that include offensive ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic weapons.
(C) In support of the homeland missile defense
mission, continued modernization and expansion of all
current deployed systems with capabilities guarding
against the homeland threat, including the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, will remain essential
to our comprehensive missile defeat approach. In
addition, the United States will also continue to
improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of
evolving hypersonic missile, cruise missile, and
unmanned system strikes by any adversary against the
homeland.
(D) The continued evolution and progress of
missiles and unmanned systems as a principal means by
which adversaries seek to project conventional or
nuclear military power makes missile and unmanned
system defense a core deterrence-by-denial component of
an integrated deterrence strategy.
(E) Missile and unmanned system defense
capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary
confidence by introducing doubt and uncertainty into
strike planning and execution, reducing the incentive
to conduct small-scale coercive attacks, decreasing the
probability of attack success, and raising the
threshold of conflict.
(F) Should deterrence fail, missile defense
capabilities sufficient to negate long-range missile
threats of any type are among the most critical
national security capabilities for the United States.
(2) Congressional commission on the strategic posture of
the united states.--Congress finds that, in its October 2023
report, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States recommended the following:
(A) The United States should develop and field
homeland integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) that
can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and
China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay
ahead of the North Korean and Iranian threat.
(B) The Secretary of Defense should direct
research, development, test and evaluation into
advanced integrated air and missile defense
capabilities leveraging all domains, including land,
sea, air, and space. These activities should focus on
sensor architectures, integrated command and control,
interceptors, cruise and hypersonic missile defenses,
unmanned systems, and area or point defenses. The
Department of Defense should urgently pursue deployment
of any capabilities that prove feasible.
(3) Commission on the national defense strategy.--Congress
finds the following:
(A) In its July 2024 report, the Commission on the
National Defense Strategy found the following:
(i) There is an increasing threat from
expanding ability of China, Russia, and North
Korea to deliver nuclear weapons against the
United States, including the territories of the
United States.
(ii) The military planners of the
Department of Defense and United States
Northern Command need to prepare for a worst-
case scenario in which nuclear and other
strikes are launched against the United States,
which could be done in large numbers with
specialized delivery systems.
(B) In the report described in subparagraph (A),
the Commission shared the same threat assessment about
missile attacks as the Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States and agreed with the
recommendation that the United States should enhance
missile defense for the homeland.
(4) Policy.--Congress finds that it is the policy of the
Federal Government that--
(A) the Federal Government will provide for the
common defense of the citizens of the United States and
the United States by deploying and maintaining a next-
generation missile defense shield;
(B) the Federal Government will deter and defend
the citizens and critical infrastructure of the United
States against any foreign attack on the United States
homeland; and
(C) the Federal Government will guarantee the
secure second-strike capability of the Federal
Government.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) as the advanced long-range missile and unmanned system
threat continues to evolve, the threat of attack by ballistic,
cruise missile, hypersonic missile, and unmanned system remains
a significant threat to the United States with potentially
catastrophic consequences;
(2) China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its
conventional forces to include ballistic missile systems posing
an increasing threat to citizens, forces, and allies of the
United States;
(3) over the past 40 years, the sophistication and quantity
of threats, including ballistic, hypersonic, cruise, and
unmanned systems has become substantial;
(4) contending only with rogue nation threats and
accidental or unauthorized missile launches is no longer
sufficient in the current and reasonably foreseeable future
threat environment;
(5) by empowering the United States with a second-strike
capability, the Golden Dome will deter adversaries from attacks
on the homeland;
(6) to improve capabilities to defend adequately against
increasing numbers and sophistication of threats to the
homeland, rapid development and deployment of space-based
sensors and interceptors which take advantage of lower cost and
technical commercial advances in recent years must be among the
Defense Department's highest priorities;
(7) there is a need to fully integrate undersea, ground,
air, and space-based sensors, interceptors, and command nodes
through a secure and redundant communications architecture;
(8) there is a need to clearly delineate and appropriately
empower the leaders and agencies responsible for development,
integration, and execution of the Golden Dome;
(9) the United States must make achieving total domain
awareness, from the seafloor to Outer Space to cyberspace, to
provide early warning and defeat of missile threats from both
the northern and southern hemispheres across all warfighting
domains a top priority;
(10) a central component of Golden Dome will be the network
and command and control systems;
(11) substantial command and control and fire control
capabilities exist now, but require investment to support any
Golden Dome reference architecture;
(12) a flexible, open-architecture approach for the Golden
Dome will support spiral development;
(13) Golden Dome prioritizes the defense of United States
citizens in the homeland against all air and missile threats
from all countries and requires prioritization of critical
assets to inform the Commander of United States Northern
Command and the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific
Command;
(14) significant additional missile defense modeling and
simulation tools that measure friendly and adversary effects,
such as kinetic, non-kinetic, directed energy, are required;
(15) the Executive order directs the ``acceleration of the
deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space
Sensor layer'' (HBTSS) and is encouraged by the fact that HBTSS
has already been demonstrated successfully on-orbit by the
Missile Defense Agency and is in active production with Space
Development Agency; and
(16) the space-based sensor industrial base has available
capacity to accept the additional orders necessary to respond
to the Executive order's explicit direction to accelerate the
deployment of HBTSS.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Commercial solution.--
(A) In general.--The term ``commercial solution''
means a product, other than real property, that--
(i) is of a type customarily used by the
general public or by nongovernmental entities
for purposes other than governmental purposes;
and
(ii)(I) has been sold, leased, or licensed
to the general public; or
(II) has been offered for sale, lease, or
license to the general public.
(B) Inclusion of commercial products, components,
and services.--The term ``commercial solution''
includes commercial products, components, and services
in alignment with the Federal Government's preference
for the acquisition of commercial products and
commercial services, as set forth in sections 1906,
1907, and 3307 of title 41, United States Code, and
sections 3451 through 3453 of title 10, United States
Code, which establish acquisition policies more closely
resembling those of the commercial marketplace and
encourage the acquisition of commercial products and
commercial services.
(2) Congressional defense committees.--The term
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Golden dome.--The term ``Golden Dome'' shall means the
holistic missile defense architecture described in this Act.
(4) Missile.--The term ``missile'' means a ballistic,
hypersonic, cruise, hypersonic cruise, or loitering munition.
(5) Program manager.--The term ``Program Manager'' means
the Golden Dome Direct Report Program Manager appointed under
section 4(a)(4)(A).
(6) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Defense.
(7) Unmanned system.--The term ``unmanned system'' means a
remote-operated or autonomous unmanned system of any size
maneuvering in land, sea, air, or space that is capable of
single attacks, swarm attacks, or sensor and data collection
and reconnaissance.
SEC. 4. IMPROVING UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
(a) Development of a Holistic Missile Defense Strategy; Golden Dome
Administration.--
(1) Development of a holistic missile defense strategy.--
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a holistic missile
defense strategy informed by discussions with and suggestions
from such other government agencies as the Secretary deems
necessary to determine which critical infrastructure must be
defended, against which adversaries, and from which specific
capabilities, including from both missiles and unmanned
systems.
(2) All-domain awareness.--The strategy developed pursuant
to paragraph (1) shall include plans for a system of layered
sensors from the seafloor to space and cyberspace to provide
persistent all-domain awareness.
(3) Integrated, redundant command and control.--The
strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include
plans for integrated, secure, open, and redundant command and
control software and technology architecture for the nationwide
missile defense system and shall designate a clear human chain
of command for control of such systems and responses.
(4) Leadership.--
(A) Establishment of a golden dome direct report
program manager.--There is established a Golden Dome
Direct Report Program Manager, who shall be appointed
by the Secretary from among the general officers of the
Army, Air Force, Space Force, or flag officers of the
Navy and Marine Corps.
(B) Grade.--The individual serving as the Program
Manager, while so serving, shall have the grade of
general without vacating the permanent grade of the
officer and will be placed directly under the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of
Defense order of precedence.
(C) Responsibilities.--The Program Manager shall be
responsible for the acquisition, contracting,
development, testing, and initial operations and
sustainment of Golden Dome.
(D) Reporting and authority.--Subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, the
Program Manager shall--
(i) report directly to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense;
(ii) have the acquisition authorities
equivalent to Defense Acquisition Executives,
including milestone decision authority,
contracting authority, direct hiring authority,
direct liaison authority with congressional
oversight committees, original classification
authority, expedited military construction
authority, and technical authority for missile
defense of the homeland;
(iii) have full authority to budget for
Golden Dome and perform oversight of funds
identified to be in support of Golden Dome
across all categories of budget authority,
regardless of reprogramming thresholds; and
(iv) establish Golden Dome program elements
and programs consistent with the format used by
the President for submittal of the budget of
the President pursuant to section 1105(a) of
title 31, United States Code, to facilitate
oversight by Congress.
(E) Exception from certain manual and directive.--
Programs or projects carried out under the authority of
this section shall not be subject to the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual
and Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, or
successor manuals and directives. The Program Manager
shall use all lawful acquisition and procurement
methods necessary outside of this process to carry out
the accelerated implementation and execution of Golden
Dome.
(F) Protection from intervention.--Unless otherwise
directed by the President, the Secretary, or statute,
no officer other than the Secretary of Defense may
intervene to exercise, authority, direction,
interference, including unreasonable delays in
answering requests for information or other requests
relating to the implementation or execution of Golden
Dome or its subsystems, or control over the Program
Manager in the discharge of responsibilities specified
in subparagraph (C) and authority specified in
subparagraph (D).
(G) Authority to work with other federal
agencies.--
(i) In general.--The Program Manager may
work with other Federal agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal