[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1883 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 99
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1883
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the
United States.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 22, 2025
Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. McCormick, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Cornyn, Mr.
Sullivan, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Mullin, and Ms. Slotkin) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
June 18, 2025
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the
United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International
Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or
``DISRUPT Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea are each considered--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in
section 825(d) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat.
322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note));</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) a country of risk (as defined in
section 6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488;
42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing
counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to
National Laboratories;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) a foreign country of concern (as
defined in section 10612(a) of the Research and
Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (Public
Law 117-167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221
note));</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) a covered foreign country (as defined
in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 1818;
10 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a
prohibition on operation, procurement, and contracting
relating to foreign-made light detection and ranging
technology; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) a covered foreign country (as defined
in section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81; 135 Stat.
2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a
strategy and plan to implement certain defense
intelligence reforms.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community
Annual Threat Assessment, the United States faces an
increasingly contested and dangerous global landscape as the
four adversaries named in paragraph (1) deepen cooperation in a
manner that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) reinforces threats posed by each such
adversary individually; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) poses new challenges to the strength
and power of the United States globally.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in
paragraph (3) is occurring bilaterally, as the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
strengthen diplomatic, economic, and military ties in
accordance with bilateral agreements, which include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11,
1961;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the People's Republic of China, issued on
March 27, 2021;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China on
International Relations Entering a New Era and Global
Sustainable Development, issued on February 4,
2022;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between the Russian Federation and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at
Pyongyang June 18, 2024;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow
January 17, 2025; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) traditional relations of friendship
and cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation
with respect to the interests of the United States occur
bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples
include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons
and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and
ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and
ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation
has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with
Su-35 fighter jets and air defense
assistance.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use
technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied
by the People's Republic of China have enabled the
Russian Federation to continue defense production in
the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls
intended to prevent the Russian Federation from
accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense
industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian
Federation has provided technical expertise on
satellite technology to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and is working closely with the
People's Republic of China on air defense and submarine
technology.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) Joint military activities and
exercises. The military forces of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea are actively participating
in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and
joint military exercises between the People's Republic
of China and the Russian Federation are expanding in
scope, scale, and geographic reach, including in close
proximity to territory of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Coordination on disinformation and
cyber operations, including coordinated messaging aimed
at denigrating and isolating the United States
internationally.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Adversaries of the United States are also
cooperating in a manner that may circumvent United States and
multilateral economic tools. Examples include the
following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) The continued purchase by the People's
Republic of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of
Iran despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the
United States on oil from the Islamic Republic of
Iran.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) The veto by the Russian Federation of,
and abstention by the People's Republic of China in a
vote on, a United Nations Security Council resolution
relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) Adversaries of the United States are
cooperating multilaterally in international institutions such
as the United Nations and through expanded multilateral
groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
group (commonly known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the
influence of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among
the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant
threat to United States interests and national
security.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) Such increasing alignment--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) allows each such adversary to
modernize its military more quickly than previously
anticipated;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in
capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries
of critical military technologies, which could erode
the technological edge of the United States Armed
Forces;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) presents increasing challenges to
strategies of isolation or containment against such
individual adversaries, since the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now
provide critical lifelines to each other;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) threatens the effectiveness of United
States economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to
evade United States sanctions and export controls and
seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that
do not require transactions in United States dollars;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) increases the chances of United States
conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries
drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that
the United States will have to contend with
simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or
more theaters.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous
aspects of cooperation between and among the People's Republic
of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by
using the threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing
such cooperation to light, and sharing information with United
States allies and partners who may--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) share the concerns and objectives of
the United States; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) have influence over such
adversaries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its
footprint or capabilities across the world; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that
the United States could face simultaneous challenges or
conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters,
including by bolstering deterrence across all priority
theaters.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
each--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) establish a task force on adversary
alignment; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) designate a point of contact on
adversary alignment, who shall serve as the head of the
task force for the applicable department, office, or
agency.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Requirements.--Each task force established
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) comprise--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) subject matter experts
covering each of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) the People's Republic
of China;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) the Russian
Federation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (III) the Islamic Republic
of Iran; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (IV) the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) representatives covering all
core functions of the department, office, or
agency of the Secretary or Director
establishing the task force; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) a mix of analysts,
operators, and senior management;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) ensure that the task force members
have the requisite security clearances and access to
critical compartmented information streams necessary to
assess and understand the full scope of adversary
cooperation, including how events in one theater might
trigger actions in another; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary
or Director who established the task force, and to the
appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) evaluating the impact of
adversary alignment on the relevant operations
carried out by the individual department,
office, or agency of the task force;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) putting forth recommendations
for such organizational changes as the task
force considers necessary to ensure the
department, office, or agency of the task force
is well positioned to routinely evaluate and
respond to the rapidly evolving nature of
adversary cooperation and the attendant
risks.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less
frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task forces
established under this section shall meet to discuss findings,
problems, and next steps with respect to adversary
alignment.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of
the United States.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal
agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the
Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees
of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation
among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks
of such cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A description of the current nature
and extent of bilateral or multilateral cooperation
among the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea across the