[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 212 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 212

Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United 
    States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 8, 2025

  Mr. Graham (for himself, Mr. Cotton, and Mrs. Britt) submitted the 
 following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United 
    States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.

Whereas the acceptable outcome of any negotiations between the United States and 
        the Islamic Republic of Iran related to Iran's nuclear program is--

    (1) the complete dismantlement and destruction of its entire nuclear 
program; and then

    (2) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (commonly known as a 
``123 Agreement'') between the United States and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153) that also requires the Islamic Republic of Iran to adopt the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's (referred to in this preamble as the 
``IAEA'') additional protocols for the verification of nuclear safeguards 
and forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and 
the development or possession of any enrichment or reprocessing 
infrastructure or capacity;

Whereas the complete dismantlement and destruction of the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran's nuclear program should include, at a minimum--

    (1) disclosing and dismantling all of the Islamic Republic of Iran's 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, including the removal 
of any previously enriched uranium;

    (2) allowing international inspectors unconditional access to monitor 
and verify compliance, including allowing short-notice inspections of all 
buildings in all of its nuclear sites by the IAEA;

    (3) providing information to the IAEA about all parts of its nuclear 
fuel-cycle;

    (4) allowing the IAEA to freely collect environmental samples at 
locations beyond the stated sites whenever the IAEA deems such collection 
is necessary;

    (5) providing the IAEA the right to monitor communications by receiving 
unimpeded access to all satellite systems and other forms of 
telecommunications;

    (6) providing designated IAEA inspectors of all nationalities valid 
visas and unimpeded entry into the Islamic Republic of Iran;

    (7) providing information on any research and development activities 
relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program;

    (8) providing the IAEA with information about the manufacturing and 
export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies;

    (9) permitting the establishment of IAEA verification mechanisms at 
manufacturing and export-import locations; and

    (10) signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol as part of its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;

Whereas more than 20 countries have a peaceful nuclear power capability without 
        the ability to domestically enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel;
Whereas in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran's secret nuclear program 
        was revealed, including the existence of a fuel enrichment plant in 
        Natanz, Iran and the heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
Whereas on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had 
        enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at 
        the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        failed to provide any explanation for the uranium remnants found at 
        undeclared sites in Iran, and such an explanation had not been provided 
        as of the date of the enactment of this Resolution;
Whereas on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had 
        achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent 
        highly enriched uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct a 
        nuclear weapon;
Whereas on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 
        percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran banned the activities of nearly \1/3\ of the IAEA's most 
        experienced nuclear inspectors in Iran, a decision that, according to 
        IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA's ability to 
        monitor Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, France, 
        Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared, ``The production of 
        high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification'';
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
        published an assessment, in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Weapons 
        Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; 
        Public Law 117-263), which stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
        ``undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear 
        device, if it chooses to do so'';
Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran has continued to expand its enrichment facilities and install 
        additional advanced centrifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear 
        Facility, where there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the 
        Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are advanced preparations for 
        the expansion of the facility;
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons of enriched uranium, and had 
        increased its total stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 
        274.8 kilograms (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could be 
        sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
        stated that the United States and Israel are ``both united in the goal 
        that Iran does not ever get nuclear weapons. If it can be done 
        diplomatically, ... I think that would be a good thing. But whatever 
        happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons'';
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President of the United States Donald Trump echoed 
        that position, stating, ``You know, it's not a complicated formula. Iran 
        cannot have a nuclear weapon. That's all there is.'';
Whereas, on April 8, 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the 
        dismantlement of its nuclear program, stating, ``Trump wants a new deal: 
        end Iran's regional influence, dismantle its nuclear program, and halt 
        its missile work. These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program 
        cannot be dismantled''; and
Whereas the United States must never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to 
        obtain a nuclear weapons capability that threatens the United States or 
        its allies or partners; Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) commends the Trump administration for engaging in 
        direct talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its 
        nuclear program;
            (2) recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran's decades of 
        cheating, the regime's barbaric nature, and its open commitment 
        to destroying the State of Israel must be addressed in any 
        negotiations; and
            (3) affirms support for--
                    (A) the complete dismantlement and destruction of 
                the Islamic Republic of Iran's entire nuclear program; 
                and then
                    (B) an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation 
                (commonly known as a ``123 Agreement'') between the 
                United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
                pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
                1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) that also requires the Islamic 
                Republic of Iran--
                            (i) to adopt the IAEA additional protocols 
                        for verification of nuclear safeguards; and
                            (ii) to forgo domestic uranium enrichment, 
                        the reprocessing of spent fuel, and the 
                        development or possession of any enrichment or 
                        reprocessing infrastructure or capacity.
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