[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2570 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2570
To impose additional sanctions with respect to Iran and modify other
existing sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 1, 2025
Mr. Nunn of Iowa (for himself, Mr. Pfluger, Mr. Williams of Texas, Ms.
Tenney, Mrs. Houchin, Mr. Ciscomani, Mr. Wittman, Mr. Collins, Mr.
Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Finstad, Mr. Owens, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr.
Crenshaw, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Fleischmann, Mr. Dunn of
Florida, Mr. Luttrell, Mrs. Hinson, Mr. Hern of Oklahoma, Mr. Bacon,
Mr. Steil, Mr. Stutzman, Ms. Salazar, Mr. Lawler, Mr. Zinke, Mr.
Langworthy, Mr. Moolenaar, Mr. Fallon, Ms. Van Duyne, Mr. Steube, Mr.
Scott Franklin of Florida, Mr. Miller of Ohio, Mr. Yakym, Mr. Huizenga,
Mr. Tony Gonzales of Texas, Mr. Goldman of Texas, Mr. Cline, and Mr.
Joyce of Ohio) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the
Judiciary, Ways and Means, Oversight and Government Reform, Financial
Services, Rules, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to
be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To impose additional sanctions with respect to Iran and modify other
existing sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Maximum Pressure
Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress on Iranian responsibility for Hamas terror
attacks on October 7, 2023.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5 Codification of united states policy.
Sec. 5. Severability.
TITLE I--MATTERS RELATING TO SANCTIONS AND SANCTION AUTHORITIES
Sec. 101. Codification of executive orders and continuation of certain
existing sanctions.
Sec. 102. Sanctions with respect to the Supreme Leader of Iran.
Sec. 103. Sanctions with respect to listed persons involved in
international arms sales to Iran.
Sec. 104. Additional conditions for termination and elimination of
sunset of sanctions under the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996.
Sec. 105. Sectoral sanctions on Iran under the Iran Freedom and
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012.
Sec. 106. Amendments to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
Sec. 107. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions
imposed with respect to Iran.
Sec. 108. Clarification of guidance relating to Iran's shipping sector.
Sec. 109. Sunset of waiver and license authorities.
Sec. 110. Codification and application on transfers of funds involving
Iran.
Sec. 111. Applicability of congressional review of certain agency
rulemaking relating to Iran.
Sec. 112. Expansion of sanctions with respect to efforts by Iran to
acquire ballistic missile and related
technology.
Sec. 113. Expansion of sanctions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 with
respect to persons that acquire or develop
ballistic missiles.
Sec. 114. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ballistic missile
program of Iran.
Sec. 115. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions
that engage in certain transactions on
behalf of persons involved in human rights
abuses or that export sensitive technology
to Iran.
Sec. 116. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that
support or conduct certain transactions
with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or
other sanctioned persons.
TITLE II--MATTERS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM
Sec. 201. Prohibitions of International Monetary Fund allocations for
Iran.
Sec. 202. Certification requirement for removal of designation of Iran
as a jurisdiction of primary money
laundering concern.
Sec. 203. Requirement to take special measures at domestic financial
institutions.
Sec. 204. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that are
officials, agents, or affiliates of, or
owned or controlled by, Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 205. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that
support or conduct certain transactions
with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or
other sanctioned persons.
Sec. 206. Reports on certain Iranian persons and sectors of Iran's
economy that are controlled by Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
TITLE III--MATTERS RELATING TO THE DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN ENTITIES
Sec. 301. Prohibition on future waivers and licenses connected to the
designation of the IRGC.
Sec. 302. Prohibition on future waivers and licenses connected to the
designation of the IRGC as a foreign
terrorist organization.
Sec. 303. Codification of Executive Order 14175 relating to Ansar Allah
in Yemen.
TITLE IV--DETERMINATIONS AND REPORTS
Sec. 401. Determinations with respect to the imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 402. Iranian militia watchlists.
Sec. 403. Expansion of reporting to include Iranian arms shipments to
the Houthis and Iranian backed militias in
Iraq and Syria.
Sec. 404. Annual report on Iran sanctions violations.
Sec. 405. Report on sanctions relief going to terrorism or
destabilizing activities.
Sec. 406. Supporting human rights for the people of Iran and the
victims of Iranian human rights abuses in
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Venezuela.
Sec. 407. Determination with respect to net worth of Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Sec. 408. IRGC watch list and report.
Sec. 409. Report on Iran's breakout timeline for uranium enrichment and
nuclear weaponization.
Sec. 410. Report on Iranian disinformation campaigns and counter-
disinformation efforts.
Sec. 411. Report on Iranian support to Hamas.
Sec. 412. Report on unblocked Iranian assets and terrorism.
Sec. 413. Report on Iranian counterintelligence threats in the United
States.
TITLE V--ADDITIONAL MATTERS
Sec. 501. Increasing rewards for justice for Hamas, Hezbollah, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other
terrorists involved in October 7, 2023,
terrorist attacks against Israel.
Sec. 502. Repurposing frozen Iranian funds for United States Victims of
State Sponsored Terrorism fund.
Sec. 503. Determination regarding applicable Iranian financial
institutions under executive order 13902.
Sec. 504. Maximizing the ability of Iranian terror victims to collect
on existing judgments against Iran.
Sec. 505. Creation of Iran Strike Fund.
Sec. 506. Iran Kleptocracy Initiative.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Iran is the world's leading State sponsor of terrorism.
It seeks ``death to America'' and the destruction of the State
of Israel.
(2) United States sanctions will continue to be applied to
and rigorously enforced against the regime in Tehran until Iran
has ceased providing support for acts of international
terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and has ceased the
pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably
dismantled its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons,
ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile launch technology.
(3) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, its efforts to
destroy the State of Israel, its support of terrorism, its
destabilizing behavior in the Middle East, its development and
proliferation of drones and ballistic missiles, and its gross
violations of human rights against its own people and the
peoples of the Middle East are a threat to the national
security of the United States, our allies, and international
peace and security.
(4) Experts from the Institute for Science and
International Security estimate that Iran, as of February 2025,
has enough highly enriched uranium to produce weapons-grade
uranium for 1 nuclear bomb in less than 7 days and has enough
enriched uranium to make weapons-grade uranium for as many as
17 nuclear bombs within 4 months. Iran continues to enrich
uranium to levels for which there is no conceivable civilian
purpose, and which could only be used to produce a nuclear
weapon.
(5) According to multiple United States Directors of
National Intelligence, Iran has the largest arsenal of
ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran also possesses a
robust cruise missile arsenal and advanced drone capability,
which threaten United States and allied air and missile
defenses. Iran tests, transfers, and even uses these systems in
military operations abroad.
(6) Iran has given ballistic missiles, drones, and
associated technology to the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias
in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon,
and is trafficking precision-guided munitions parts through the
Middle East to upgrade the rocket forces of its chief proxy,
Hezbollah.
(7) Iran has sold thousands of drones to Russia for its use
in its invasion of Ukraine, leading to mass attacks on civilian
infrastructure, and has given Russia the technology and
knowledge to produce these drones in Russia.
(8) Iran continues to take United States citizens hostage
to extract ransom payments from the United States and exchange
arbitrarily detained United States citizens for Iranian agents
arrested for violating United States sanctions and for other
malign activities.
(9) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
negotiated by former President Barack Obama was fatally flawed,
did not eliminate Iran's pathway to a nuclear weapon, and
allowed Iran to retain and refine its ability to quickly resume
its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
(10) The failed Iran nuclear agreement allowed Iran to
export more than $300,000,000,000 of goods and services from
2015 to 2017 that was used by Iran to fuel proxy wars across
the Middle East.
(11) The failed Iran nuclear agreement lifted the United
Nations conventional arms embargo on Iran in October 2020,
permitting Russia and China to engage in international arms
sales with Iran.
(12) The failed Iran nuclear agreement also lifted the
United Nations missile embargo on Iran in October 2023,
allowing Iran to sell and purchase drone and ballistic missile
technology.
(13) A central flaw of the failed Iran nuclear deal was
that the agreement solely focused on nuclear weapons and did
not address non-nuclear issues like Iran's support for
terrorism, drone and ballistic missile technology, gross human
rights abuses, and Iran's other malign activities.
(14) Iran received significant sanctions relief from the
previous sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United
States, and previous United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions.
(15) Iran used this sanctions relief to fund its terrorist
proxies, regional aggression, and its expansion of its
ballistic missile program.
(16) Iran has repeatedly violated the terms of the JCPOA
and UNSCR 2231, including by--
(A) lifting the cap on its stockpile of uranium;
(B) increasing its enrichment activities to 60
percent purity, expanding its enrichment capabilities;
(C) resuming its activity at prohibited nuclear
facilities; and
(D) preventing the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) from being able to effectively monitor
its nuclear activities.
(17) Iran repeatedly violated UNSCR 2231's restrictions on
ballistic missile testing and development, as well as United
Nations-imposed and internationally binding arms export and
import embargoes.
(18) UNSCR 2231 includes a formal mechanism for a
participant state of the JCPOA, if it believes there has been
significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA by
Iran, to trigger a process that would require the UNSC to
``snapback'' all United Nation sanctions on Iran that has been
lifted pursuant to UNSCR 2231.
(19) On September 14, 2024, in a joint statement, the
United States and United Kingdom acknowledged publicly that
Iran's nuclear program ``has never been more advanced and posed
a clear threat to regional and global peace and security''.
(20) In June and November of 2024, in efforts led by
France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3), and the United
States, the IAEA's Board of Governors voted to censure Iran for
non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington,
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the
``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or ``NPT'').
(21) In February 2025, the IAEA reported that Iran has
increased production of 60 percent highly enriched uranium from
7 kilograms to roughly 35 kilograms per month, and currently
possesses about 275 kilograms, enough to fuel nearly 7 nuclear
weapons. According to the Institute for Science and
International Security, if Iran enriched all its uranium stocks
to 90 percent, it could fuel 17 weapons within 4 months.
(22) Under UNSCR 2231, the resolution, including the
``snapback'' mechanism, terminates 10 years after Adoption Day
for the JCPOA, which will be October 18, 2025.
(23) The E3 must invoke the ``snapback'' of United Nations
sanctions against Iran under UNSCR 2231 as soon as possible
before the option expires on October 18, 2025.
(24) 2 weeks after President Trump withdrew from the failed
Iran nuclear deal, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo laid
out 12 demands that would need to be met by Iran as part of any
agreement related to the lifting of sanctions, and the re-
establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran.
(25) Former President Donald Trump's maximum pressure
campaign on Iran denied the regime unprecedented revenue it
would have otherwise spent on terrorism.
(26) On December 31, 2019, then-Iranian President Hassan
Rouhani admitted that Iran had lost $200,000,000,000 in revenue
because of United States sanctions.
(27) Iran's 2019 defense budget cut defense spending by 28
percent, including a 17 percent cut to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, a designated foreign terrorist
organization. Hezbollah terrorists and Iranian backed militias
were denied resources and were forced to cut salaries of their
fighters.
(28) The Iranian rial lost around 70 percent of its value
due to President Trump's maximum pressure campaign.
(29) According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran's
accessible foreign exchange reserves plunged to $4,000,000,000
in 2020 from $123,000,000,000 in 2018, or a decrease of over 96
percent.
(30) During the maximum pressure campaign, the United
States was able to achieve the release of 2 hostages in Iran,
Xiyue Wang and Michael White, without lifting sanctions or
transferring cash to Iran.
(31) President Joe Biden's relentless attempts to re-enter
the failed Iran nuclear agreement squandered much of the
leverage created by President Trump's maximum pressure
campaign.
(32) The Biden Administration's pursuit of an even weaker
deal with Iran broke previous pledges made by administration
officials to pursue a ``longer and stronger'' deal that
extended sunset dates of restrictions, and which would cover a
broader range of Iran's malign activity.
(33) Amid the multiple failed rounds of talks to get Iran
to re-enter the Iran nuclear agreement, the Biden
administration reportedly offered to remove the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps from the Foreign Terrorist
Organization list, despite the group's obvious involvement in
and support for terrorism, until news of this offer became
public.
(34) The Iranian regime has made around $200,000,000,000 in
illicit oil sales since President Biden took office due to the
administration's lax enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil
exports. Total Iranian oil exports reached nearly 2,000,000
barrels per day in August 2023, the highest since before the
maximum pressure campaign began.
(35) In 2021, Iran increased funding for the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps by 14 percent, reversing budget cuts
imposed as a result of maximum pressure.
(36) Iran's accessible foreign exchange reserves have risen
from $4,000,000,000 in 2020 to at least $43,000,000,000 in
2023.
(37) In July 2023, the United States unfroze nearly
$10,000,000,000 held in Iraqi banks