[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 5377 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 5377
To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information
for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry
out such strategy, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 21, 2024
Mr. Cardin (for himself and Mr. Sullivan) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To develop a strategy for increasing access to independent information
for Chinese citizens, to establish an interagency task force to carry
out such strategy, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Titles.--This Act may be cited as the ``Informing a
Nation with Free, Open, and Reliable Media Act of 2024'' or the
``INFORM Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short titles; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Statement of policy.
Sec. 6. Strategy for increasing access to independent information for
citizens of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 7. Establishment of the Global News Service.
Sec. 8. Increasing coordination and resources for censorship
circumvention, secure sharing, and content
creation initiatives.
Sec. 9. Addressing the lack of reciprocity between the United States
and the People's Republic of China in the
information space.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist
Party.
(2) Coordinator.--The term ``Coordinator'' means the
coordinator of the interagency task force appointed by the
President pursuant to section 8(b).
(3) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of State.
(4) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(5) RFA.--The term ``RFA'' means Radio Free Asia.
(6) USAGM.--The term ``USAGM'' means the United States
Agency for Global Media.
(7) VOA.--The term ``VOA'' means Voice of America.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Since the advent and proliferation of the internet, the
Chinese Communist Party has viewed the global, cross-border,
and open information environment the internet created as an
existential threat to its legitimacy, its effective
indoctrination and control of its citizens, and its
authoritarian political system.
(2) Despite brief periods of increased openness in the
internet ecosystem of the People's Republic of China during the
early 2000s, the CCP has since expended billions of dollars to
develop a digital information control regime (commonly known as
the ``Great Firewall of China'') that is a wholescale
substitution of the global internet with compelling, nearly
universally used domestic platforms with built-in censorship
and surveillance features as alternatives, which has
fundamentally reshaped its population's behavior.
(3) Through this system in the PRC, the ``Great Firewall''
blocks foreign internet search providers, independent news and
media websites, circumvention and secure messaging tools, and
other content deemed undesirable by the CCP.
(4) The PRC also engages in meta-level censorship to
obscure the possibility of circumvention and surveillance
evasion by criminalizing VPNs, blocking discussion of anti-
censorship methods, widespread app removal from app stores, and
related techniques.
(5) Chinese internet users must contend with expansive
repressive digital surveillance that often results in real-
world consequences and leads to significant self-censorship.
(6) Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, the CCP
and government organs have prioritized--
(A) the censorship and surveillance of their
citizens' online behavior; and
(B) the indoctrination of the CCP's--
(i) authoritarian worldview;
(ii) anti-American and anti-West
propaganda; and
(iii) intent to undermine and redefine the
United States-led global order.
(7) The PRC's internet censorship regime systematically--
(A) amplifies the voices of nationalistic internet
users;
(B) silences the voices of moderate or dissenting
voices;
(C) suppresses information that threatens the
credibility of the CCP, including reports of corruption
and of unexplained wealth held by CCP and People's
Liberation Army officials and their families; and
(D) creates an echo chamber on the PRC domestic
internet that makes it challenging for international
observers to decipher--
(i) the prevailing beliefs, values, and
perspectives of different segments of PRC
society; and
(ii) their views on the domestic and
foreign policies of the PRC government.
(8) Concurrent with the increased sophistication and
refinement of the PRC's censored and restricted information
space, the CCP has expended billions of dollars to build an
asymmetric advantage by reengineering its population's online
norms concurrent with--
(A) exploiting the open and uncensored online
information environment in the United States and many
countries globally to advance its pro-CCP and anti-
United States propaganda and disinformation; and
(B) highly restricting the United States online and
public diplomacy activities in the PRC.
(9) The United States Ambassador to China, Nicholas Burns,
recently stated that the PRC's Ministry of State Security has
interrupted and effectively cancelled 61 public in-person and
online events organized by the United States mission in China
since November 2023.
(10) Despite a comprehensive censorship and surveillance
regime, the relentless indoctrination by CCP and PRC government
organs, and the highly coordinated, systematized, and
repressive structure of the PRC censorship and propaganda
apparatus, PRC citizens have begun to demonstrate--
(A) a lack of confidence and satisfaction in their
government's policies, conduct, and the information
available to them within the PRC's censored and
restrictive online information space; and
(B) a growing willingness to express dissent
online, seek alternative sources of information and
engagement, and call for greater economic and political
freedoms.
(11) In a recent Stanford University study, researchers
discovered that PRC university students who were exposed to
foreign news and independent content changed their knowledge,
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors suggesting that demand for
uncensored information can persist and may generate pressure on
the PRC censorship apparatus.
(12) In 2021, during a period when the Clubhouse
application was briefly uncensored in the People's Republic of
China, downloads and engagement on Clubhouse rapidly increased
and provided an opportunity for PRC internet users to openly
discuss sensitive topics, including--
(A) the reeducation camps in Xinjiang;
(B) the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; and
(C) the future of Taiwan.
(13) One Clubhouse user penned a hashtag, which was viewed
more than 50,000,000 times, calling the discussions the
``Renaissance of China''.
(14) In 2022, during the multi-city ``White Paper''
protests in defiance of the Government of the PRC's zero-COVID-
19 policy, internet users in the PRC expressed solidarity and
organized the protests through a variety of online platforms.
(15) Information technology news outlet Techopedia released
a report and data indicating that, despite being largely
blocked and criminalized, the usage of VPNs in the PRC doubled
during 2023.
(16) In February 2024, after the United States Embassy in
Beijing posted information on China's popular Weibo social
media platform discussing scientists' use of satellite data to
track and monitor the movement of giraffes, the platform was
inundated with comments from PRC internet users lamenting the
state of the PRC economy and recent turmoil in its stock, bond,
and real estate markets, with many users expressing a desire
for help from the United States.
(17) The demand among PRC citizens for independent and
alternative sources of information is growing, while the level
of United States Government funding to disseminate
circumvention tools to PRC citizens so they can access
independent information has remained at consistently low
levels, especially compared to the billions of renminbi
(Chinese yuan) the PRC is spending to censor and monitor its
internet ecosystem.
(18) Publicly-funded VPNs supported through the Open
Technology Fund are used by millions of monthly active users in
China and have proven to be resilient. Traditional
circumvention tools, such as VPNs, are necessary but are not
sufficient to address the unique challenge of China's socio-
technological information control system.
(19) Increasing access to independent information for PRC
citizens will aid broader United States efforts--
(A) to engage PRC citizens;
(B) to provide credible and reliable alternative
sources of information for PRC citizens regarding
events occurring within the PRC and globally;
(C) to promote a balanced understanding of the
United States among PRC citizens; and
(D) to support PRC citizens in their efforts to
advance their individual freedoms and human rights and
hold their government accountable.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government
should--
(1) prioritize the development of a vision and strategy for
engaging with PRC citizens through the development and delivery
of Mandarin Chinese-language content that is timely,
compelling, and pertinent to--
(A) the issues and challenges they face in their
daily lives;
(B) the domestic and foreign policy decisions of
the PRC government; and
(C) the governance failures and corruption of the
CCP, including unexplained wealth held by CCP and PLA
officials and their families;
(2) increase the level of coordination among Federal
agencies to develop and disseminate timely, compelling, and
pertinent Mandarin Chinese-language content that is otherwise
blocked by the PRC government's highly censored and restrictive
internet ecosystem;
(3) dually prioritize--
(A) access to independent information through
circumvention and other tools for PRC citizens; and
(B) the secure sharing of such content in the PRC's
highly censored internet ecosystem;
(4) optimize the impact of circumvention and secure content
sharing tools by more effectively pairing such tools with
timely, compelling, and pertinent Mandarin Chinese-language
content; and
(5) seek to counter the lack of reciprocity with the PRC in
the online information and public diplomacy space.
SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to make increasing access to independent information
for and engagement with the roughly 1,400,000,000 PRC citizens
a national security priority of the United States that benefits
broader United States priorities to promote human rights, the
rule of law, and good governance in the PRC and globally;
(2) to prioritize the expansion and improvement of the
development and dissemination of independent information to PRC
citizens inside and outside the People's Republic of China,
including by more effectively pairing independent information
with the circumvention and other tools needed to access such
content;
(3) to prioritize and coordinate Mandarin Chinese-language
content development and content dissemination, and develop
technical solutions to address the PRC's digital information
controls; and
(4) to work with like-minded partners and allies--
(A) to develop coordinated and complementary
strategies for increasing access to independent
information for PRC citizens; and
(B) to address the lack of reciprocity in the
information and media environments between the PRC and
the United States and its partners and allies.
SEC. 6. STRATEGY FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION FOR
CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) President's Strategy.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives for increasing access
to independent information for citizens of the PRC who are within or
outside the PRC.
(b) Strategy Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a plan for increasing the accessibility and adoption of
circumvention and secure communications tools within the PRC,
which may include--
(A) an assessment of the technical challenges of
the PRC's information control regime; and
(B) an evaluation of research, technological, and
other gaps that may affect strategy implementation;
(2) an assessment of Mandarin Chinese-language content
creation and distribution capabilities within the Department,
across the interagency task force established pursuant to
section 8, and among other Federal departments and agencies, as
appropriate, including--
(A) whether United States Government-produced,
Mandarin Chinese-language content is accessible either
inside or outside the PRC;
(B) the uptake of, and engagement with, various
types of content among citizens of the PRC within or
outside the PRC;
(C) the use of survey tools and other data sources
to assess the areas of interest and concern, whether
domestic or international, among different segments of
PRC citizens; and
(D) where gaps or duplication of effort exist in
the efficacy of the Mandarin Chinese-language content
developed and disseminated by the Department or the
interagency task force, and how such gaps or
duplication will be addressed through the strategy;
(3) a description of how the Department plans to improve
coordination between components of the Department, and across
the interagency task force, in--
(A) developing and disseminating compelling,
accessible Mandarin Chinese-language content within and
outside the PRC's information control regime while
avoiding duplication; and
(B) funding outside organizations to develop
circumvention and secure content sharing tools;
(4) a description of how the Department plans to promote
greater convergence and pairing between the development and
dissemination of effective and high quality content and the
circumvention tools used to access and share such content;
(5) a description of how the Department plans to develop
networks with known and emerging Mandarin Chinese-language
content developers and social media influencers through
initiatives such as media and internet freedom programs based
outside of the PRC;
(6) an assessment of the current efficacy of content
generated by the Department that is disseminated within the
PRC, including by United States embassies and consulates within
the PRC, and how Department plans to improve the efficacy and
use of content disseminated within the PRC;
(7) a plan for increasing digital engagement with citizens
of the PRC who are living or traveling outside of the PRC by
providing them with temporary access to an uncensored internet
environment; and
(8) a description of any additional resources, including
additional funding or authorities, needed to further the
objectives outlined in the strategy.
(c) Classification.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.
(a) Establishment.--The United States International Broadcasting
Act of 1994 (title III of Public Law 103-236; 22 U.S.C. 6201 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 309A the following:
``SEC. 309B. GLOBAL NEWS SERVICE.
``(a) Authority.--
``(1) In general.--Grants authorized under section 305(a)
shall be available to make annual grants for the purpose of
curating, translating, distributing, and making available
content created or disseminated by the Voice of America, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Middle East
Broadcasting Networks, t