[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 833 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 833
Countering disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and calling for multi-stakeholder efforts to
address the significant detrimental effects that the rise in
disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in regional information
environments has on democratic governance, human rights, and United
States national interests.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 19, 2024
Mr. Lujan (for himself, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Kelly,
Mr. Warner, and Mr. Murphy) submitted the following resolution; which
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Countering disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and calling for multi-stakeholder efforts to
address the significant detrimental effects that the rise in
disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation in regional information
environments has on democratic governance, human rights, and United
States national interests.
Whereas the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press are core
pillars of democratic governance throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean, as recognized in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, done
at Lima September 11, 2001;
Whereas the vulnerability of existing information environments in Latin America
and the Caribbean and the growing spread of inaccurate or false news
through disinformation and misinformation activities pose serious
threats to democratic governance and human rights in the Americas, which
are likely to be further exacerbated by the rise of disinformation
generated and enhanced by artificial intelligence;
Whereas disinformation and misinformation activities in Latin American and the
Caribbean have--
(1) promoted harmful, false narratives spread by the People's Republic
of China and the Russian Federation, according to research by Global
Americans and the Equis Institute, including with respect to the COVID-19
pandemic and the unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation;
(2) posed risks to the integrity of electoral processes throughout the
region, including in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, according to a report
entitled ``Disinformation in Democracies: Strengthening Digital Resilience
in Latin America'' issued in March 2019 by the Atlantic Council;
(3) contributed to protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador,
oftentimes amplified by operations linked to the Russian Federation,
according to reporting by the New York Times;
(4) contributed to the exploitation of migrants by human smuggling
networks that drive irregular migration, according to multiple
investigations by the Tech Transparency Project; and
(5) contributed to a rise in xenophobic violence against migrants and
refugees, according to multiple sources, including the Digital Forensic
Research Lab;
Whereas information environments are closely interconnected between the United
States and Latin America and the Caribbean, such that disinformation and
misinformation flows between Latino populations in the United States and
populations in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to a report
entitled ``Latinos and a Growing Crisis of Trust'' issued in June 2022
by the Equis Institute;
Whereas, according to the report entitled ``Measuring the Impact of
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Propaganda in Latin America'' issued
in October 2021 by Global Americans (referred to in this preamble as the
``Global Americans Report''), intra- and extra-regional actors operate
independently and in tandem to create and spread disinformation in Latin
America and the Caribbean on both traditional and digital media
platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, TikTok, WhatsApp, and
Telegram, where such activities are amplified through coordinated
inauthentic behavior, such as the use of bots, trolls, and cyber troops;
Whereas political actors throughout Latin America and the Caribbean have
manipulated domestic information environments by targeting citizens
through disinformation activities, including in--
(1) Brazil, where former President Jair Bolsonaro had a direct role in
spreading electoral disinformation, according to the Superior Electoral
Court of Brazil and the Federal Police of Brazil;
(2) El Salvador, where President Nayib Bukele uses coordinated
inauthentic networks to attack political opponents and bolster the
perception of support for his policies, according to reporting by Reuters;
(3) Guatemala, where malicious actors with links to the then ruling
party of former President Alejandro Giammattei carried out information
operations to artificially amplify narratives eroding trust in the
country's 2023 electoral process and targeting now President Bernardo
Arevalo and his political party Semilla, according to research by the
Digital Forensic Research Lab;
(4) Honduras, where actors linked to former President Juan Orlando
Hernandez developed coordinated inauthentic networks to spread falsehoods
about, and undermine support for, opposition party candidates, according to
reporting by Time;
(5) Mexico, where President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador spreads false
and misleading narratives against the media and other independent
institutions, according to research by the Digital Forensic Research Lab;
and
(6) Venezuela, where actors linked to the regime of Nicolas Maduro have
engaged in a sustained and synchronized campaign of disinformation to
undermine the country's 2023-2024 electoral process, invalidate the results
of such elections, and attack Maria Corina Machado and other opposition
leaders, according to multiple sources, including the Digital Forensic
Research Lab;
Whereas, in addition to spreading and amplifying disinformation against their
own populations, authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
have also engaged in such activities against other countries in the
region for purposes of undermining democratic values and spreading
narratives contrary to the interests of the United States and its
allies, including through coordinated efforts with extra-regional
actors, such as publishing and amplifying false narratives by Russian
state-controlled media outlets;
Whereas, according to the Global Americans Report, the Governments of the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic
Republic of Iran have engaged in disinformation and propaganda
operations aimed at undermining the influence and interests of the
United States in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly through
the use of state-affiliated media networks targeting Spanish-speaking
audiences, such as CGTN TV and Xinhua News, RT and Sputnik, and
HispanTV;
Whereas, according to a public statement by the Department of State on November
7, 2023, the Russian Federation is ``currently financing an on-going,
well-funded disinformation campaign across Latin America'', including in
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil,
Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay;
Whereas, according to the Digital Forensic Research Lab and EUvsDisinfo, the
Russian Federation considers social media outreach to Spanish-speaking
and Portuguese-speaking audiences an important component of its state-
sponsored media strategy, and the Spanish-language social media accounts
of Kremlin-controlled media RT and Sputnik have more followers and
engagement than their English- and Russian-language counterparts and
comparable programming from the United States Agency for Global Media;
Whereas information environments in Latin America and the Caribbean are further
distorted by the rise in the practice of disinformation for hire, by
which political actors outsource information operations to regional and
extra-regional public relations firms that impersonate local news
outlets, civic organizations, and other entities through fake social
media accounts and engage in other deceptive practices to create and
amplify disinformation for profit;
Whereas the threats and effects of disinformation and misinformation in Latin
America and the Caribbean are exacerbated by--
(1) the widespread use of social media and closed messaging platforms,
where disinformation and misinformation is spread faster and farther, as
primary communication and news sources, as indicated by the Reuters
Institute Digital News Report 2022;
(2) high barriers of access to other forms of independent media and low
media and digital literacy rates that lead to the unintentional spread of
disinformation and misinformation;
(3) growing levels of distrust in public institutions, as indicated by
recent AmericasBarometer surveys by the Latin American Public Opinion
Project; and
(4) low levels of transnational coordination among relevant
stakeholders within the region;
Whereas, on March 3, 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the
Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information
issued a declaration entitled ``Joint Declaration on Freedom of
Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda'', which
cautioned against the criminalization and regulation of disinformation
and misinformation activities and called instead for joint efforts by
relevant stakeholders;
Whereas some current efforts by governments in Latin American and the Caribbean
to counter disinformation raise serious freedom of expression concerns
that run counter to the recommendations made in the ``Joint Declaration
on Freedom of Expression and Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda'';
Whereas government and political actors in some Latin American and Caribbean
countries have undertaken notable efforts to address the threat of
disinformation in ways consistent with the protection of freedoms of
expression and the press, including--
(1) political parties in Uruguay, which signed an ethics pact in April
2019 pledging to not generate or promote disinformation against political
adversaries; and
(2) the national electoral institution of Panama, which engaged in
joint workshops with the electoral institutions of Argentina in June 2019
and Costa Rica in September 2021 to share best practices on monitoring and
countering information operations on social media;
Whereas, despite discernible progress in taking down accounts used by prominent,
often foreign-backed, disinformation networks to engage in coordinated
inauthentic activity and partnering with regional stakeholders, efforts
by social media companies, including Facebook and Twitter, to address
disinformation and misinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean
continue to be hampered by--
(1) insufficient resources and attention devoted to countering such
activities in low- and middle-income countries, as documented by multiple
sources, including the Facebook Papers;
(2) significant gaps in the detection and enforcement of Spanish-
language disinformation and misinformation relative to such English-
language activities;
(3) enduring barriers to transparency and access for social media
datasets and algorithms that are critical to independent disinformation and
misinformation research; and
(4) limited cooperation among social media companies on plans and best
practices to mitigate disinformation networks operating across platforms;
Whereas independent media, civil society, and academic groups have launched
several initiatives to address disinformation and misinformation on
social media and closed messaging platforms in Latin America and the
Caribbean through fact-checking, media and digital literacy, and
information sharing services, including Chequeado, Comprova, Verificado,
and Cazadores de Fake News; and
Whereas the United States has pursued efforts to support the strengthening of
information environments, promote independent media, and counter
disinformation activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, including
through initiatives led by the Global Engagement Center, the United
States Agency for International Development, the United States Agency
for Global Media, and United States embassies in the region: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Senate--
(1) recognizes the serious threats the distortion of
information environments through the creation and amplification
of disinformation and misinformation on traditional and digital
media platforms poses to democratic governance and human rights
in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(2) denounces independent and coordinated efforts by
malicious actors to create and amplify disinformation in the
Western Hemisphere, including foreign information operations
led by the Governments of the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cuba, and
Nicaragua and the Maduro regime in Venezuela;
(3) urges social media companies to take additional steps
to address how social media platforms are used to facilitate
malicious activities, including disinformation, in Latin
America and the Caribbean, including by--
(A) devoting significantly more resources to
monitoring how such platforms are being exploited to
spread false news, incite violence, and interfere with
democratic electoral processes in the region;
(B) strengthening detection and removal enforcement
capabilities against sources of Spanish-language and
other non-English disinformation content;
(C) improving transparency over regional content
moderation efforts to counter disinformation, the
training and auditing of social media algorithms for
Spanish-language and other non-English content, and
datasets critical for disinformation and misinformation
research;
(D) expanding and strengthening partnerships with
local actors, including initiatives with third-party
fact checkers and independent, democratic electoral
institutions;
(E) investing in media and digital literacy
education in the region; and
(F) strengthening coordination with one another on
plans and best practices to help limit the spread of
disinformation content online;
(4) calls on governments in Latin America and the Caribbean
to counter disinformation activities and strengthen information
environments by--
(A) bolstering regional mechanisms to coordinate
responses and share best practices on countering
disinformation;
(B) advancing efforts by political parties and
other actors to publicly commit to refrain from
generating or amplifying disinformation content through
coordinated inauthentic behavior or outsourcing such
activities to public relations firms; and
(C) safeguarding and strengthening free and
independent media, promoting fact-checking, increasing
use of digital forensics, and boosting media literacy
efforts by civil society, journalists, and academia;
and
(5) calls on the President and the heads of all relevant
Federal agencies and departments to strengthen the role of the
United States in countering the creation and amplification of
disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean and
bolstering regional information environments, including by--
(A) increasing support for the activities described
in paragraph (4);
(B) ensuring strong support for and coordination of
concurrent efforts between all relevant bureaus and
offices of the Department of State and the United
States Agency for International Development;
(C) ensuring strong support for relevant efforts
within the United States Agency for Global Media;
(D) convening regional fora, with participation
from all relevant stakeholders, to discuss and develop
methods to promote a strong, independent media and
counter the spread and amplification of disinformation,
including through a high-level summit and a Global
Engagement Center Tech Challenge;
(E) pursuing measures--such as public
identification, targeted sanctions, and information
sharing and coordination with social media companies in
identifying accounts spreading disinformation--to deter
and hold accountable government officials in Latin
America and the Caribbean who undermine democratic
governance by targeting independent media or engaging
in activities to create and amplify disinformation; and
(F) strengthening the capacity of the United States
Government to mitigate the impact and influence of
local state-affiliated media outlets of malicious
extra-regional actors by offering objective, reliable,
and accurate information, including through--
(i) increased investment in public
diplomacy programming by the United States in
Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly
programming aimed at engaging with local
audiences through social media and messaging
platforms; and
(ii) increased resources and programming
from the United States Agency for Global Media
tailored to audiences in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
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