[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 718 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 718
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government
should immediately place a moratorium on all federally funded gain-of-
function research given the increased safety concerns.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 4, 2024
Mr. Marshall (for himself, Mr. Braun, and Mr. Lee) submitted the
following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States Government
should immediately place a moratorium on all federally funded gain-of-
function research given the increased safety concerns.
Whereas the Obama Administration defined gain-of-function studies as research
that aims to increase the ability of infectious agents to cause disease
by enhancing its pathogenicity or by increasing its transmissibility;
Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, mandated a Federal
Government pause on new gain-of-function research, citing recent
concerns regarding biosafety and biosecurity;
Whereas the Obama Administration, on October 17, 2014, stated that new Federal
funding will not be released for gain-of-function research projects that
may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to the influenza,
Middle East respiratory syndrome (referred to in this preamble as
``MERS''), or severe acute respiratory syndrome (referred to in this
preamble as ``SARS'') viruses such that such a virus would have enhanced
pathogenicity or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route;
Whereas in the lead up to the Obama Administration pausing new gain-of-function
research, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention noted an
increase in accidents involving leaks, spills, or other releases of
infectious material inside the laboratories receiving Federal funding;
Whereas the Cambridge Working Group, a consortium of some of the leading
international researchers and scientists, released a 2014 open letter
stating ``experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic
pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative,
objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and
opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer
experimental approaches.'';
Whereas in 2014, after the Obama Administration mandated a pause on gain-of-
function research, the National Institutes of Health (referred to in
this preamble as ``NIH''), led by Francis Collins, including the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (referred to in
this preamble as ``NIAID''), led by Anthony Fauci, continued to
authorize grants and research awards to organizations that study the
spread of viruses from animals to humans;
Whereas some such awards went to EcoHealth Alliance and its President, Peter
Daszak, who then disbursed research money to the Wuhan Institute of
Virology (referred to in this preamble as the ``WIV'') and East China
Normal University;
Whereas experiments advanced by EcoHealth Alliance during the pause included,
among other projects, combining genetic material from a ``parent''
coronavirus, known as WIV1, with other viruses;
Whereas the results of such experiments demonstrated varying pathogenicity of
SARS-CoV-2 with different spike proteins in humanized mice;
Whereas a majority of scientists and researchers, including Dr. Lawrence Tabak
and Dr. Ralph Baric, an EcoHealth Alliance collaborator and top
coronavirus expert, when made aware of such experiment, admitted that
EcoHealth Alliance's coronavirus research appeared to meet the standard
criteria for gain-of-function research;
Whereas NIH and NIAID continued to support EcoHealth Alliance and other
organizations conducting gain-of-function research, according to the
Obama Administration's definition, through 2017, even though the pause
remained in effect;
Whereas on July 7, 2016, NIAID identified possible gain-of-function research
concerns in an experiment proposed by EcoHealth and conducted by the
WIV;
Whereas in May 2021, Anthony Fauci conceded that during the period between 2014
and 2017 that ``it is impossible to guarantee that researchers at the
Wuhan Institute of Virology did not use American funds to perform gain-
of-function research on coronaviruses.'';
Whereas Anthony Fauci and NIAID did not alert senior White House officials
before lifting a ban on gain-of-function research in 2017;
Whereas in November 2019, 3 researchers from the WIV became sick enough to
receive hospital care, and according to United States officials, those
sick researchers were involved in coronavirus research;
Whereas the Chinese government deliberately delayed notifying the World Health
organization that it had detected SARS-like infections from an unknown,
novel pathogen well before it sent official notification in December
2019;
Whereas on April 24, 2020, NIH instructed EcoHealth to terminate all funding to
the WIV, and NIH terminated the WIV's entire sub-grant award;
Whereas in July 2020, NIH, having procedurally erred in its April 2020
termination of EcoHealth's grant, reinstated and then immediately
suspended EcoHealth's grant while requiring EcoHealth to meet certain
conditions, such as obtaining a sample of the SARS-CoV-2 virus that the
Wuhan lab used to determine its genetic sequence and arranging for an
independent team to examine the Wuhan lab and determine whether it had
possession of the SARS-CoV-2 virus prior to December 2019;
Whereas Peter Daszak reacted to those conditions by calling them
``preposterous'';
Whereas based on tips from the scientific community that suspected EcoHealth's
science research at the WIV may have caused the COVID-19 pandemic
outbreak, NIH investigated EcoHealth's compliance with its grant
agreement terms, including the gain-of-function provisions in June 2016
and again from April 2020 to April 2023 and concluded that EcoHealth was
noncompliant;
Whereas in October 2021, NIH acknowledged to Congress that EcoHealth Alliance
did not have access to laboratory notebooks or other records supporting
its research, even though keeping such records was a requirement of the
NIH grant;
Whereas although EcoHealth's Year 5 Research Performance Progress Report for its
research activities was due to NIH in September 2019, EcoHealth did not
submit the report until August 3, 2021;
Whereas on October 20, 2021, it was revealed than an experiment in EcoHealth's
Year 5 Progress Report (for research between June 2018 and May 2019)
exhibited virus growth greater than one log, thus constituting gain-of-
function research, which should have triggered immediate suspension and
reporting to NIAID according to contract agreements;
Whereas instead of EcoHealth taking either action, EcoHealth used language in
its report that obfuscated the severity and timing of the gain-of-
function experiments, which contradicted the Obama-era pause on gain-of-
function research and the additional terms of agreement NIH added to
EcoHealth's grant in June 2016;
Whereas in October 2021, NIH updated the definition of gain-of-function research
to focus more on enhanced pandemic potential pathogens (referred to in
this preamble as ``ePPP''), which meant that because the majority of
gain-of-function research does not include ePPPs, once considered gain-
of-function research now fell outside the scope of the stricter
oversight required for ePPP studies;
Whereas NIH determined that no evidence existed to support the testimony Peter
Daszak gave to Congress on November 14, 2023, that EcoHealth was
prevented from submitting its Year 5 Research Performance Progress
Report to NIH due to a technical problem in NIH's system;
Whereas in April 2023, when NIH reinstated EcoHealth's suspended grant and
imposed new conditions, NIH stated that it was executing a corrective
action plan to EcoHealth that satisfied NIH's compliance efforts
regarding gain-of-function research;
Whereas as part of the April 2023 reinstatement, EcoHealth pledged it would not
perform work in, or with, Chinese-affiliated institutions;
Whereas the prime reasoning for EcoHealth's reinstatement was EcoHealth's
representation to NIAID that EcoHealth had access to sequences and
samples that were required to be supplied to the Federal Government as a
condition of receiving Federal grants, which still needed analysis;
Whereas EcoHealth was not forthcoming and failed to disclose to NIAID that those
samples were stored in China at the WIV, which was EcoHealth's
subcontractor that conducted the coronavirus gain-of-function research
that could have caused the COVID-19 pandemic;
Whereas as of new guidance issued in May 2024, the Biden Administration removed
avian influenza and current forms of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes
Covid-19, from the category of pathogens of pandemic potential, thus
excluding them from updated rules governing gain-of-function research;
Whereas effective May 14, 2024, the Department of Health and Human Services
(referred to in this preamble as ``HHS'') announced it would commence
official debarment proceedings against EcoHealth Alliance and implement
a government-wide suspension of United States taxpayer funds to include
a hold on all active grants;
Whereas on May 21, 2024, HHS, in an effort to protect public interest, suspended
and recommended debarment of Peter Daszak's individual ability to
receive any Federal funds;
Whereas both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy
have assessed that the COVID-19 pandemic was a result of a lab leak from
the WIV;
Whereas the majority members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Pandemic of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the House
of Representatives (referred to in this preamble as the
``Subcommittee'') reported that EcoHealth's actions were often enabled
by NIH and NIAID and the failures of NIH and NIAID to properly oversee
EcoHealth's research projects;
Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee found that EcoHealth's actions
were often enabled by the lack of grant management and oversight by NIH
and NIAID; and
Whereas the majority members of the Subcommittee believe that such NIH and NIAID
grant management oversight failures necessitate both Congressional and
Executive action to increase transparency and grantee oversight: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Congress should
immediately consider the Viral Gain-of-Function Research Moratorium Act
(S. 81, 118th Congress, as introduced on January 25, 2023), which
would--
(1) define gain-of-function research as any research that--
(A) could confer attributes to the influenza,
Middle East respiratory syndrome, or severe acute
respiratory syndrome viruses such that such a virus
would have enhanced pathogenicity or transmissibility
in any organism; or
(B) involves methods that could enhance potential
pandemic pathogens or related risky research with
potentially dangerous pathogens; and
(2) prohibit, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
research grants supported by Federal funds from being awarded
to institutions of higher education, or other research
organizations, that are conducting gain-of-function research.
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