[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3235 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 374
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3235
To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of
China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect
to Iran, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 7, 2023
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Moran, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Scott of
Florida, Mr. Hagerty, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Budd, Mr.
Cassidy, Mrs. Britt, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Braun, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Hoeven,
and Mr. Ricketts) introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
May 7, 2024
Reported by Mr. Cardin, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of
China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect
to Iran, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``End Iranian Terrorism Act
of 2023''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided
hundreds of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas
and other terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
that directly threaten Israel;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global
security and has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil
revenues since 2021;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the People's Republic of China, seeking to
secure reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased
roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since
2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed
by the United States with respect to Iran;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum
products by the People's Republic of China and other countries
fund the Iranian regime's suppression of human rights in Iran,
provide valuable resources for Iran's terrorist proxies, and
provide additional resources for support by Iran for the
Russian Federation in its unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary
to United States policy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement
directly undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-
Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) increasing encroachment by the People's
Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa, include
involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil
trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the
United States; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) the United States should immediately enforce
existing sanctions, including sanctions provided for in
Executive Order 13846 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand
sanctions designations to include persons that store Iranian
oil, ship-to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port
operators, refineries and refinery operators, and other
individuals and entities, particularly in the People's Republic
of China, dealing in Iranian-origin oil and
petrochemicals.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
DEFINED.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN EVASION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
IRAN.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to
those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's
Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States
with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an
assessment of options--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such
sanctions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the
involvement of the People's Republic of China in the
production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of
Iranian-origin petroleum products.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) a description of the use of sanctions in
effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target
individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that
are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of
Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) an assessment of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the People's Republic of China's
petroleum refining capabilities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) which of the People's Republic of
China's refineries are at high risk of processing
Iranian-origin petroleum products and why;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) Iranian-owned entities operating in
the People's Republic of China and involved in
petroleum refining supply chains;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the People's Republic of China's role
in global petroleum refining supply chains;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) how the People's Republic of China
leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to
achieve political objectives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) the People's Republic of China's
petroleum importing and exporting partners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) what percent of the People's Republic
of China's energy consumption is linked to illegally
imported Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) the amount of money the People's
Republic of China saves by illegally importing
discounted Iranian-origin petroleum products rather
than paying market price;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) what level of influence the Chinese
Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent
``teapot'' refineries; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (J) the challenges limiting the ability of
the United States to impose or enforce sanctions with
respect to such refineries, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) Lawen Namu Petroleum Trading
Company;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) Qihang Energy; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) Shangang Guomao;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) a detailed plan for--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) monitoring the maritime domain for
smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products in
violation of sanctions imposed by the United States,
including through--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) automatic identification
system monitoring;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) satellite imagery;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) vessel comparison and tanker
classification;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) receiving tips from
operators; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (v) creating a database of
reported potential sanctions
violations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) identifying the individuals, entities,
and vessels responsible for such smuggling, including--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) vessels--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) operated by the
National Iranian Tanker Company or any
other Chinese or Iranian entity subject
to sanctions imposed by the United
States;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) transporting
petrochemicals subject to
sanctions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (III) conducting ship-to-
ship transfers of such
petrochemicals;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (IV) with deactivated
automatic identification systems;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (V) that engage in ``flag
hopping'' by changing national
registries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) individuals or entities--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) storing petrochemicals
subject to sanctions; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) refining or otherwise
processing such petrochemicals;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) through the use of port
entry and docking permission of vessels subject
to sanctions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) assessing the viability of seizing
targets identified as belonging to entities smuggling
Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of
sanctions imposed by the United States, including--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) location;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) origin and
destination;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) seaworthiness; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) asset value;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) seizing, prosecuting, and, if
appropriate, liquidating viable targets identified as
belonging to entities involved in such
smuggling;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) deterring individuals and entities
from violating sanctions by educating and engaging--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) insurance providers;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) parent companies;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) vessel operators;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) collaborating with allies and partners
of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula,
including through standing or new maritime task forces,
to build sanctions enforcement capacity through
assistance and training to defense and law enforcement
services; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) using public communications and global
diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of
petroleum product smuggling in supporting Iran's human
rights abuses and destabilizing terrorism activities;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) an assessment of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the total number of vessels smuggling
Iranian-origin petroleum products;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the total number of vessels smuggling
such petroleum products destined for the People's
Republic of China;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the number of vessels smuggling such
petroleum products specifically from the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the most strategic locations for
intercepting smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products
destined for the People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) interference from the People's
Republic of China in attempts by the United States to
investigate or enforce sanctions on Iranian petroleum
product exports;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) the effectiveness of the use of
sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own
or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin
petroleum products;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) the distinction between the total
number of suspected violations of sanctions related to
smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products and the
number of vessels legally viable to seize and prosecute
in litigation, if any, and an accompanying explanation
for each;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) the personnel and resources needed to
enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin
petroleum products; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) the impact of smuggled Iranian-origin
petroleum products on global energy markets.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
index.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) identify each foreign entity, including any
member of the Chinese Communist Party or an entity organized
under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China,
that the President determines meets the criteria for the
imposition of sanctions under--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-172;50 U.S.C. 1701 note);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8501 et seq.);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) section 1245 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8513a);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et
seq.);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et
seq.);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) title I of the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et
seq.);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) any Executive order imposing sanctions
with respect to Iran issued under the authority
provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) any other provision of law imposing
sanctions with respect to Iran; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) impose sanctions applicable under existing law
with respect to each such entity.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report Required.--Not later than 30 days after the
imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign
entity, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the sanctions imposed.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``End Iranian Terrorism Act of 2024''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided hundreds
of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas and other
terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that
directly threaten Israel;
(2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global security and
has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil revenues since
2021;
(3) the People's Republic of China, seeking to secure
reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased
roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since
2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed
by the United States with respect to Iran;
(4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum products by the
People's Republic of China and other countries fund the Iranian
regime's suppression of human rights in Iran, provide valuable
resources for Iran's terrorist proxies, and provide additional
res