OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION
Office of Research Legislative Budget
www.lsc.ohio.gov and Drafting Office
H.B. 179 Final Analysis
135th General Assembly
Click here for H.B. 179’s Fiscal Note
Primary Sponsors: Reps. Mathews and Stewart
Effective date: October 24, 2024
Effective date:
Aida S. Montano, Research Analyst
SUMMARY
Tolling of limitations period
▪ Provides that the tolling of the limitations period during the defendant’s absence or
concealment does not apply to statutes of repose.
▪ Declares that the General Assembly’s purpose is to expressly overrule the decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Elliot v. Durrani.
Vicarious liability
▪ Provides that if tort liability arises against both a principal and agent, master and servant,
employer and employee, or other persons having a vicarious liability relationship, the
injured party may sue either the primarily liable agent, servant, employee, or person or
the secondarily liable principal, master, employer, or person, or both.
▪ Stipulates that for the injured party to prevail in a tort action alleging vicarious liability
against a secondarily liable person, both of the following apply:
A primarily liable person committed the tortious act in the course of, and within the
scope of, that person’s agency or servant relationship with, or employment by, the
secondarily liable person.
A primarily liable person is not a necessary party to the tort action alleging vicarious
liability against a secondarily liable person, with certain exceptions.
▪ Provides that for a principal, master, or employer to be found liable for the tortious act,
an agent, servant, or employee must have committed such tortious act in the course of,
or within the scope of, the agent’s, servant’s, or employee’s agency or servant
relationship with, or employment by, the principal, master, or employer.
August 19, 2024
Office of Research and Drafting LSC Legislative Budget Office
DETAILED ANALYSIS
Tolling of limitations period
The act modifies the law on the tolling of statutes of limitations by providing exceptions
to the tolling of the limitations period for the commencement of certain actions when the person
against whom a cause of action accrues is out of the state, has absconded, or conceals self, until
the person comes into the state or while the person is so absconded or concealed.1 Under the
act, the limitations periods for statutes of repose, including, but not limited to, statutes of repose
on the following claims or actions are not tolled when the person against whom a cause of action
accrues is out of the state, has absconded, or conceals self:2
▪ Product liability claims against the product manufacturer or supplier;
▪ Medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claims;
▪ Assault or battery actions against a mental health professional;
▪ Legal malpractice claims;
▪ Actions arising out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property.
Declaration
The act states that the General Assembly, in amending R.C. 2305.15, declares that its
purpose is to expressly overrule the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Elliot v.
Durrani.3
Vicarious liability
Background
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master becomes liable in damages for
injuries caused solely by the negligent act of the master’s servant while acting for the master; the
servant is primarily liable and the master is secondarily liable to the injured party. If the master
is obliged to respond in damages by reason of such liability, the master will be subrogated to the
right of the injured party and may recover the master’s loss from the servant, the one primarily
liable.4
1 R.C. 2305.15(A)(1).
2 R.C. 2305.15(A)(2).
3 Section 3. In Elliot v. Durrani, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4190, the Ohio Supreme Court, in the case
involving a medical claim, held that the legislature has made clear in the unambiguous language of
R.C. 2305.15 that an absconding defendant is not entitled to a four-year statute of repose that is not
tolled.
4 Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183 (1940).
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Final Analysis
Office of Research and Drafting LSC Legislative Budget Office
Tort action alleging vicarious liability
In a tort action alleging respondeat superior or vicarious liability, the act provides that the
following apply:
▪ If liability arises against both a principal and agent, master and servant, employer and
employee, or other persons having a vicarious liability relationship, the injured party may
sue either the primarily liable agent, servant, employee, or person (primarily liable
person) or the secondarily liable principal, master, employer, or person (secondarily liable
person), or both.5
▪ For the injured party to prevail in a tort action alleging respondeat superior or vicarious
liability against a secondarily liable person, both of the following apply:6
A primarily liable person committed the act or omission on which the tort action is
based, while in the course of, and within the scope of, that person’s agency or servant
relationship with, or employment by, the secondarily liable person.
A primarily liable person is not a necessary party to the tort action alleging respondeat
superior or vicarious liability against a secondarily liable person, unless the tort action
is any of the following: (a) an action upon a medical claim against a physician,
podiatrist, or physical therapist, (b) an action upon a dental claim against a dentist,
(c) an action upon an optometric claim against an optometrist, (d) an action upon a
chiropractic claim against a chiropractor, or (e) an action upon a legal malpractice
claim against an attorney.
The act provides that nothing in its provisions modifies the legal principle that the
respondeat superior or vicarious liability of a principal, master, employer, or person is derivative
of the liability of an agent, servant, employee, or person. In order for a principal, master,
employer, or person to be found liable for the act or omission on which a tort action is based, an
agent, servant, employee, or person must have committed such act or omission while in the
course of, or within the scope of, the agent’s, servant’s, employee’s, or person’s agency or
servant relationship with, or employment by, the principal, master, employer, or other person.7
Definitions
The act defines “chiropractic claim,” “chiropractor,” “dental claim,” “dentist,” “medical
claim,” “optometric claim,” “optometrist,” “physical therapist,” “physician,” and “podiatrist” as
having the same meanings as in continuing law on medical, dental, chiropractic, and optometric
claims.8
5 R.C. 2307.241(B)(1).
6 R.C. 2307.241(B)(2).
7 R.C. 2307.241(C).
8 R.C. 2307.241(A).
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Final Analysis
Office of Research and Drafting LSC Legislative Budget Office
HISTORY
Action Date
Introduced 05-22-23
Reported, H. Civil Justice 06-20-23
Passed House (92-0) 01-10-24
Reported, S. Judiciary 06-26-24
Passed Senate (31-0) 06-26-24
24-anhb0179en-135/ks
P a g e |4 H.B. 179
Final Analysis
Statutes affected: As Introduced: 2305.15
As Reported By House Committee: 2305.15
As Passed By House: 2305.15
As Reported By Senate Committee: 2305.15
As Passed By Senate: 2305.15
As Enrolled: 2305.15