BILL NUMBER: S10701
SPONSOR: FAHY
TITLE OF BILL:
An act to amend the general business law, in relation to independent
safety evaluations, monitoring, reporting, security, mitigation, employ-
ee protections and enforcement relating to frontier artificial intelli-
gence models
PURPOSE:
Enacts the technical evaluation, risk monitoring, incident notification,
Al testing, oversight, and response act or the TERMINATOR Act
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:
Section 1 establishes the short title, the "TERMINATOR Act."
Section 2 amends General Business Law § 1420 to add definitions relating
to independent safety evaluators, material modifications, significant
safety incidents, privileged frontier model access, risk-based monitor-
ing, tamper-evident records, and catastrophic harm.
Section 3 amends General Business Law § 1421 to require transparency
reports to summarize findings from required independent safety evalu-
ations.
Section 4 amends General Business Law § 1422 to expand catastrophic-risk
and safety-incident reporting, require supporting technical information,
and address substantially equivalent federal reporting.
Section 5 adds General Business Law §§ 1430 through 1436 to establish
independent safety evaluations, reevaluation following material changes
or new risks, post-deployment monitoring, tamper-evident records, privi-
leged-access and model-weight security requirements, catastrophic-risk
mitigation authority, and protected safety disclosures and research.
Section 6 amends General Business Law § 1427 to establish enhanced civil
penalties for concealment, obstruction, interference with independent
evaluations, and related misconduct.
Section 7 amends General Business Law § 1428 to authorize existing
developer assessments to support administration and enforcement of the
expanded requirements.
Section 8 amends General Business Law § 1429 to expand rulemaking, tech-
nical-assistance, consultation, and intergovernmental-coordination
authority.
Section 9 contains a severability clause. Section 10 establishes the
effective date.
JUSTIFICATION:
The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (Al) continues to
raise serious concerns about potentially catastrophic risks associated
with the technology. Increasingly, leading Al developers are documenting
enhanced offensive cyber capabilities, evidence of oversight-evasion and
deception, and growing capacity for autonomous replication. The 2026
International Al Safety Report warns that the rapid expansion of fron-
tier capabilities is outpacing the effectiveness of imperfect safe-
guards, underscoring the need for ongoing oversight and independent
testing of model safety.
New York established an important framework for addressing these risks
in the RAISE Act, which, among other requirements, requires large fron-
tier developers to establish and follow frontier Al safety frameworks,
assess catastrophic risks, protect model weights, and report critical
safety incidents. However, New York's framework substantially relies on
Al developers' self-assessment of their own models. Developers determine
the effectiveness of their own safeguards and are able to characterize
the results of those assessments without submitting the underlying data
or allowing for independent external review. Compliance with a develop-
er's safety framework does not necessarily establish whether an advanced
Al model actually possesses dangerous capabilities or whether the safe-
guards intended to constrain those capabilities are actually functional.
Examining this problem, a 2026 Model Evaluation and Threat Research
(METR) pilot was given access to the most capable non-public models of
companies, including Anthropic, Google, Meta, and OpenAl. The report
recommended that third-party risk assessments become standard industry
practice
This legislation establishes an independent technical safety layer on
top of the existing RAISE framework both before and after frontier model
deployment. Before a covered frontier model could be deployed in New
York, an independent evaluator would be required to test the model's
capabilities and safeguards, including through adversarial testing where
appropriate. Independent testing and requiring submission of underlying
data pre-deployment and after safety incidents will allow regulators to
more thoroughly examine the safety claims of developers, rather than
solely relying on the corporate characterization of those claims.
Moreover, this legislation recognizes that critical safety issues may
still exist after deployment. Post-training, fine-tuning, increased
autonomy, access to tools or computing resources, and other post-deploy-
ment modifications may change a model's capabilities in a manner that
materially impacts the model's associated safety risks. Recognizing
this hazard, the bill requires the reevaluation of frontier models
following material modifications or significant new evidence of danger-
ous capabilities. It also provides for risk-based post-deployment moni-
toring, reporting of serious warning signs and near misses, and the
preservation of safety-relevant records. Where evaluations, monitoring,
safety incidents, or other evidence identify an unreasonable risk of
catastrophic harm, the legislation establishes an escalating framework
for regulatory intervention, balancing the seriousness of risk to the
public with allowing frontier developers to mitigate their models'
risks. Upon the identification of such a risk, developers must implement
mitigation safeguards and may be required to submit to additional moni-
toring by the Office. If the risk remains unmitigated, the bill creates
a process for temporary and targeted restrictions, subject to notice and
periodic renewal. More significant intervention is reserved for findings
of substantial evidence of imminent and unreasonable risk of catastroph-
ic harm, upon which the bill authorizes the Attorney General to seek
injunctive relief in court.
More broadly, the bill also addresses the safety infrastructure ecosys-
tem surrounding frontier models. The legislation requires tamper-evident
records of safety actions and establishes cybersecurity requirements for
privileged access and model weights. Additionally, the bill creates
whistleblower protections for employees and contractors who make good-
faith safety disclosures. Enhanced penalties are also established for
deliberate obstruction of oversight, including safety records tampering.
Importantly, the TERMINATOR Act is not a general regulatory regime for
artificial intelligence, and operates within the existing RAISE frame-
work. It is applicable to a limited class of large frontier developers,
and its requirements are directed specifically at catastrophic risk.
This act creates meaningful independent oversight of the most consequen-
tial risks associated with frontier models, while avoiding regulation of
ordinary Al systems.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
To be determined.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
This act shall take effect one year after it shall have become law;
provided, however, that if chapter 96 of the laws of 2026 shall not have
taken effect on or before such date, then this act shall take effect one
year after such chapter takes effect.
Statutes affected: S10701: 1420 general business law, 1421 general business law, 1421(3) general business law, 1422 general business law, 1422(2) general business law, 1427 general business law, 1428 general business law, 1428(4) general business law, 1429 general business law