BILL NUMBER: S5609
SPONSOR: SALAZAR
 
TITLE OF BILL:
An act to amend the executive law, in relation to prohibiting the use of
biometric surveillance technology by law enforcement; to establish the
biometric surveillance regulation task force; and providing for the
repeal of certain provisions upon expiration thereof
 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:
To prohibit the use of biometric surveillance technology by law enforce-
ment and establish a task force to examine the issue, determine whether
the use of such technology should be allowed, and if so, propose a
comprehensive set of standards for use of such technology.
 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:
Section 1 of the bill sets forth legislative intent, noting the signif-
icant lack of regulation and oversight of law enforcement use of biome-
tric surveillance technology and the risks to the civil rights, civil
liberties and dure process rights of all New Yorkers caused by this lack
of oversight.
Section 2 of the bill creates a new Section 837-u of the Executive Law
to prohibit the use of biometric surveillance systems by police offi-
cers, peace officers, and police agencies, with certain exceptions for
lawful and authorized DNA comparison, fingerprinting, internal security
systems, and other purposes. The new section 837-u defines the terms
"biometric information", "biometric surveillance", "biometric surveil-
lance system", "surveillance information", and "use".
Section 3 of the bill creates a new Section 234 of the Executive Law to
enact statutory provisions consistent with the provisions of Section
837-u that would apply to members of the State Police.
Section 4 of the bill establishes the Task Force on the Regulation of
Biometric Surveillance, consisting of twelve members including represen-
tatives from the State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice
Services, the NYPD, and members appointed by the Governor and Legisla-
ture with expertise in data security, civil rights and liberties, biome-
tric surveillance, legal representation, and/or criminal defense.
The Task Force would be directed to study the current and proposed use
of biometric surveillance systems by governments and/or law enforcement,
and current laws, rules, regulations, and policies governing their use.
It would also be directed to evaluate the effectiveness, efficacy, and
accuracy of such systems, as well as their potential harms, taking into
account the impact of such systems on certain vulnerable or protected
populations.
The Task Force would also be directed to evaluate whether the use of
such systems by law enforcement should be permitted, and if so, the Task
Force must propose a comprehensive framework of recommendations for
legislation, regulations, and standards regarding the use of such
systems. The bill specifies certain guidelines that the Task Force must
follow when developing that framework. The bill requires the Task Force
to transmit a report of its findings to the Governor and Legislature no
sooner than January 1, 2029 and no later than January 1, 2030.
Section 5 of the bill establishes the bill's effective date.
 
JUSTIFICATION:;
As the use of biometric surveillance technology becomes increasingly
common, concerns have been raised by advocates for privacy and civil
liberties relating to the effectiveness and ethical implications of such
technology.
Significant evidence exists to suggest that facial recognition technolo-
gy in particular is less accurate when analyzing faces of people of
color than when analyzing faces of white people. A 2018 study from MIT
and Stanford University examining commercially available facial analysis
programs created by three major companies found that the three programs'
rates of error in determining the gender of light-skinned men were never
worse than 0.8%, but the rates of error for dark-skinned women were
significantly higher, with two of the programs showing an error rate of
more than 34%.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran a test of another widely
available facial recognition tool by comparing photos of members of
Congress with a database of mugshots, and the software incorrectly
matched 28 members of Congress with individuals who had been arrested
for a crime. A disproportionate number of the incorrect matches were
people of color.
This evidence of bias and inaccuracy is particularly troubling in the
context of law enforcement, where an incorrect match has the potential
to have devastating consequences.
In June of 2019, Axon (formerly Taser), a major manufacturer of body-
worn cameras for police departments across the country including the
NYPD, publicly stated that they "will not be commercializing face match-
ing products" on their body cameras due to bias concerns, saying that
"face recognition technology is not currently reliable enough to
ethically justify its use on body-worn cameras." Axon added, "At the
least, face recognition technology should not be deployed until the
technology performs with far greater accuracy and performs equally well
across races, ethnicities, genders, and other identity groups. Despite
these major concerns, police departments across the country continue to
partner with major corporations actively marketing facial recognition
software. Agreements with certain companies have given law enforcement
access to home security cameras and other smart devices capable of
either employing biometric surveillance technology or supplying footage
or data to be run through biometric surveillance systems.
The harms of the overuse of this technology are not theoretical. For an
example of how it can he misused, we need only look to China, which
maintains a vast DNA database and has a massive network of surveillance
cameras capable of using real-time automated facial recognition to moni-
tor the movements of people within its borders. The technology has been
used to monitor, track, and profile Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim minority
within China. Here in the United States, the use of this emerging tech-
nology is almost entirely unregulated, leaving weighty decisions regard-
ing the ethical implications of its use solely in the hands of law
enforcement. Given the serious concerns that have been raised about
presently available biometric surveillance technology, New York's law
enforcement should not presently be permitted to deploy or rely on it as
a policing tool that could potentially lead to wrongful targeting,
arrest or imprisonment.
This bill would prohibit such practice and convene a state Task Force to
examine the issue in depth and propose a comprehensive set of standards
for use of such technology in the future if it is to be allowed.
 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
Senate:
2025 - S. 1033 (Hoylman-Sigal) Referred to Internet and Technology.
Enacting clause stricken.
2023-2024 - S.1540 (Hoylman-Sigal) Referred to Internet and Technology.
2021-2022 - S.0079 (Hoylman) Referred to Internet and Technology.
2019-2020 - S.7572 (Hoylman) Referred to Internet and Technology.
Assembly:
2023-2024 - A. 751 (Dinowitz) Referred to Governmental Operations.
2021-2022 - A.5492 (Gottfried) Referred to Governmental Operations.
2019-2020 - A.9767 (Glick) Referred to Governmental Operations.
 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
To be determined.
 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
This act shall take effect immediately.