BILL NUMBER: S1033
SPONSOR: HOYLMAN-SIGAL
 
TITLE OF BILL:
An act to amend the executive law, in relation to prohibiting the use of
biometric surveillance technology by law enforcement; to establish the
biometric surveillance regulation task force; and providing for the
repeal of certain provisions upon expiration thereof
 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:
To prohibit the use of biometric surveillance technology by law enforce-
ment and establish a task force to examine the issue, determine whether
the use of such technology should be allowed, and if so, propose a
comprehensive set of standards for use of such technology.
 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:
Section 1 of the bill sets forth legislative intent.
Section 2 of the bill creates a new Section 837-u of the Executive Law
to prohibit the use of biometric surveillance systems by police offi-
cers, peace officers, and police agencies, with certain exceptions for
lawful and authorized DNA comparison, fingerprinting, internal security
systems, and other purposes. The new section 837-u defines the terms
"biometric information", "biometric surveillance", "biometric surveil-
lance system", "surveillance information", and "use".
Section 3 of the bill creates a new Section 234 of the Executive Law to
enact statutory provisions consistent with the provisions of
Section 837-u that would apply to members of the State Police.
Section 4 of the bill establishes the Task Force on the Regulation of
Biometric Surveillance, consisting of twelve members including represen-
tatives from the State Police, the Division of Criminal Justice
Services, the NYPD, and members appointed by the Governor and Legisla-
ture with expertise in data security, civil rights and liberties, biome-
tric surveillance, legal representation, and/or criminal defense.
The Task Force would be directed to study the current and proposed use
of biometric surveillance systems by governments and/or law enforcement,
and current laws, rules, regulations, and policies governing their use.
It would also be directed to evaluate the effectiveness, efficacy, and
accuracy of such systems, as well as their potential harms, taking into
account the impact of such systems on certain vulnerable or protected
populations.
The Task Force would also be directed to evaluate whether the use of
such systems by law enforcement should be permitted, and if so, the Task
Force must propose a comprehensive framework of recommendations for
legislation, regulations, and standards regarding the use of such
systems. The bill specifies certain guidelines that the,Task Force must
follow when developing that framework. The bill requires the Task Force
to transmit a report of its findings to the Governor and Legislature no
sooner than January 1, 2024 and no later than January 1, 2025.
Section 5 of the bill establishes the bill's effective date.
 
JUSTIFICATION:
As the use of biometric surveillance technology becomes increasingly
common, concerns have been raised by advocates for privacy and civil
liberties relating to the effectiveness and ethical implications of such
technology.
Significant evidence exists to suggest that facial recognition technolo-
gy in particular is less accurate when analyzing faces of color than
when analyzing white faces. A 2018 study from MIT and Stanford Universi-
ty examining commercially available facial analysis programs created by
three major companies found that the three programs' rates of error in
determining the gender of light-skinned men were never worse than 0.8%,
but the rates of error for dark-skinned women were significantly higher,
with two of the programs showing an error rate of more than 34%.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran a test of another widely
available facial recognition tool by comparing photos of members of
Congress with a database of mugshots, and the software incorrectly
matched 28 members of Congress with individuals who had been arrested
for a crime. A disproportionate number of the incorrect matches were
people of color.
This evidence of bias and inaccuracy is particularly troubling in the
context of law enforcement, where an incorrect match has the potential
to have devastating consequences.
In June of 2019, Axon (formerly Taser), a major manufacturer of body-
worn cameras for police departments across the country including the
NYPD, publicly stated that they "will not be commercializing face match-
ing products" on their body cameras due to bias concerns, saying that
"face recognition technology is not currently reliable enough to
ethically justify its use on body-worn cameras." Axon added, "At the
least, face recognition technology should not be deployed until the
technology performs with far greater accuracy and performs equally well
across races, ethnicities, genders, and other identity groups.
Despite these major concerns, police departments across the country
continue to partner with major corporations actively marketing facial
recognition software. Agreements with certain companies have given law
enforcement access to home security cameras and other smart devices
capable of either employing biometric surveillance technology or supply-
ing footage or data to be run through biometric surveillance systems.
The harms of the overuse of this technology are not theoretical. For an
example of how it can he misused, we need only look to China, which
maintains a vast DNA database and has a massive network of surveillance
cameras capable of using real-time automated facial recognition to moni-
tor the movements of people within its borders. The technology has been
used to monitor, track, and profile Uighurs, an ethnic Muslim minority
within China.
Here in the United States, the use of this emerging technology is almost
entirely unregulated, leaving weighty decisions regarding the ethical
implications of its use solely in the hands of law enforcement. Given
the serious concerns that have been raised about presently available
biometric surveillance technology, New York's law enforcement should not
presently be permitted to deploy or rely on it as a policing tool that
could potentially lead to wrongful targeting, arrest or imprisonment.
This bill would prohibit such practice and convene a state Task Force to
examine the issue in depth and propose a comprehensive set of standards
for use of such technology in the future if it is to be allowed.
 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
S.1540 of 2023-2024 (Hoylman-Sigal): Died in Internet and Technology
A.1751 of 2023-2024 (Dinowitz): Died in Governmental Operations
S.0079 of 2021-2022 (Hoylman): Died in Internet and Technology
A.5492 of 2021-2022 (Gottfried): Died in Governmental Operations
S.7572 of 2019-2020 (Hoylman): Died in Internet and Technology
A.9767 of 2019-2020 (Glick): Died in Governmental Operations
 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
To be determined.
 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
This act shall take effect immediately.