BILL NUMBER: S206B
SPONSOR: CLEARE
 
TITLE OF BILL:
An act to amend the judiciary law, in relation to removing the lifetime
ban on jury duty for convicted felons
 
PURPOSE:
To remove the lifetime ban on jury duty for people convicted of felonies
who have completed all sentencing requirements.
 
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS:
This bill amends the Judiciary Law to remove the lifetime ban on jury
duty for people convicted of felonies who have completed all sentencing
requirements.
 
JUSTIFICATION:
The Bill is called Jury Of Our Peers, or JOOP. Jury service is a corner-
stone of our democratic system. The jury may be a different institution
from the ballot box, but their democratic char- acter and their quintes-
sential activity of voting is the same. Founding era historian Alexis de
Tocqueville recognized that in America, jury service was essential to
citizenship in a self-governing free society as "both the most effective
way of establishing the people's rule and the most efficient way of
teaching them how to rule." In New York, the importance of the jury
system as an institution of democratic control of the administration of
justice pre-dates both the federal and state constitutions. In the cele-
brated 1735 case of John Peter Zenger, a New York jury thwarted the
attempt of the colonial government to prosecute a publisher for sedi-
tious libel for printing articles critical of the governor. Gouverneur
Morris, a New Yorker who was the "Scrivener of the Constitution,"
described Zenger's case as "the germ of American freedom, the morning
star of that liberty which subsequently revolutionized Amer- ica." Prior
to the adoption of the United States Constitution, New York's 1787 Bill
of Rights protected the right to trial by a jury of one's peers.
People with felony convictions are as capable of serving as jurors as
any other group of citizens. Current law permanently excluding them jury
service relies upon unsupported stereotypes about the moral character
and fitness of people convicted of felonies. These stereotypes are
doubly inappropriate in Manhattan, given its history of racialized
policing and prosecution. New York's voir dire process already provides
for individualized screening of prospective jurors in civil trials, in
criminal trials, and on grand juries. Moreover, New York law does not
categorically bar from jury service people whose convictions or conduct
more directly implicates an individual's fitness for jury service. For
example, a person can still serve on a jury in New York if they have
been convicted of tampering with a juror in the first degree, a misde-
meanor conviction that includes a finding of "communicating with a
juror" with "intent to influence the outcome of an action or proceed-
ing." For further examples, people found liable for civil fraud,
disbarred lawyers, and officials who have lied to the public and even
courts remain eligible for jury service as long as they have not been
criminal prosecuted for their dishonesty and convicted of a felony.
These categories of people are not banned from jury service; instead,
New York law relies on voir dire to determine whether these people
should serve on a jury.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia either never exclude
people with felony convictions from jury service or provide for automat-
ic restoration of eligibility after a set time. Maine does not ever bar
otherwise-eligible citizens from jury service because of a criminal
conviction. Indiana and North Dakota exclude incarcerated citizens, but
otherwise permit jury service regardless of conviction record. Alaska,
Illinois, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin exclude
citizens with felony convictions only during the term of sentence. Illi-
nois, Idaho, and Iowa permit citizens with felony convictions to serve
after they complete their sentence but permit for-cause challenges based
on the fact of conviction. Finally, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Nevada, Oregon, and the District of Columbia each exclude citizens with
felony convictions for the duration of their sentences and then only for
a finite time period after the completion of sentence.
Ending the permanent ban on jury service by people with conviction
histories will serve the interests of justice by increasing the size and
diversity of the jury pool, as well as the quality of deliberations.
Given the long history of racially-disparate criminal law enforcement,
as the New York State Bar Association's Special Committee Consequences
of Criminal Proceedings recognized about criminal record-based jury
disqualification in 2006, "it is impossible to argue that these
restrictions do not impact the racial composition of the jury pool."
Over three decades ago, the New York State Judicial Commission on Minor-
ities (now, the Franklin H. Williams Judicial Commission) found as part
of comprehensive three-and-half year study that "minorities are signif-
icantly underrepresented on many juries in the court system," and there
"is reason to believe that minority underrepresentation affects jury
outcomes in ways that disadvantage minority litigants." The systematic
underrepresentation of New Yorkers of color in jury pools reduces public
confidence in jury verdicts and the legal system generally. Extensive
academic research supports the conclusion that more diverse juries
enhance the quality of deliberations and confidence in the legal system.
Moreover, the provision of the Judiciary Law that this bill repeals is
'currently the subject of a federal lawsuit alleging that the categori-
cal exclusion of people convicted of felonies from jury service is
unconstitutional as applied in New York County. The pending lawsuit,
Justin v. Tingling states that decades of racially-biased policing and
prosecutorial practices results in the exclusion from jury service more
than one out of every of four otherwise jury-eligible Black residents of
New York County and the underrepresentation of Black people, and partic-
ularly Black men, from the New York County jury pool to cite but one
example.
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
2019-20: S.221A/A4760-A 1 Passed Senate Judiciary Committee, Passed
Senate Floor
 
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
None Noted.
 
LOCAL FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
None Noted.
 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
180 Days.

Statutes affected:
S206: 510 judiciary law, 510(3) judiciary law
S206A: 510 judiciary law, 510(3) judiciary law
S206B: 510 judiciary law, 510(3) judiciary law