Retitles GS Chapter 49A to Assisted Reproduction and Surrogacy Agreements (currently titled Rights of Children). Adds new Article to GS Chapter 49A, Assisted Reproduction, providing as follows. Specifies that the article does not does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by sexual intercourse or assisted reproduction under a surrogacy agreement under GS Chapter 49A, Article 3. Defines eight terms, including assisted reproduction (a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse, including intrauterine or intracervical insemination, donation of gametes or embryos, in-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection). Specifies that a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted production and that an individual who consents under the article to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction is a parent of the child. Directs that the consent must be in a record signed by the woman giving birth to a child conceived by assisted reproduction and an individual who intends to be the parent of the child. Allows a court to find that a person consented to parentage in the absence of such signed consent if either: (1) the woman or the individual proves by clear and convincing evidence the existence of an express agreement entered into before conception that the individual and the woman intended they both would be parents of the child or (2) the woman and the individual for the first two years of the child's life, including any period of temporary absence, resided together in the same household with the child and both openly held out the child as the individual's child, unless the individual dies or becomes incapacitated before the child attains two years of age or the child dies before the child attains two years of age, in which case the court may find consent to parentage if a party proves by clear and convincing evidence that the woman and the individual intended to reside together in the same household with the child and both intended the individual would openly hold out the child as the individual's child, but the individual was prevented from carrying out that intent by death or incapacity.