Legislative Analysis
Phone: (517) 373-8080
COUNTY COMMISSIONER REDISTRICTING
http://www.house.mi.gov/hfa
House Bill 6171 as reported from committee Analysis available at
Sponsor: Rep. Phil Skaggs http://www.legislature.mi.gov
Committee: Elections
Complete to 12-13-24
SUMMARY:
House Bill 6171 would amend 1966 PA 261, which governs county boards of commissioners,
to revise the procedures for drawing county commissioner districts.
The act requires county apportionment commissions to apportion each county into between
five and 21 commissioner districts of as nearly equal population as is practicable within 60
days after the publication of the latest United States Census Bureau data. House Bill 6171
would retain these provisions but modify the number of districts that a county may be divided
into, the county apportionment commission selection process, and the ranked criteria for
apportionment. The bill would also establish procedures for judicial review of a county
commissioner district apportionment plan.
Number of county commissioner districts
Currently, 1966 PA 261 provides that a county can be divided into the following number of
county commissioner districts, based on its population:
• Up to seven, for a county with a population of 5,000 or less.
• Up to ten, for a county with a population between 5,001 and 10,000.
• Up to 15, for a county with a population between 10,001 and 50,000.
• Up to 21, for a county with a population of more than 50,000.
Under House Bill 6171, the number of county commission districts would be as follows:
• Between five and seven, for a county with a population of less than 50,000.
• Between seven and nine, for a county with a population between 50,000 and 100,000.
• Between nine and 13, for a county with a population between 100,001 and 250,000.
• Between 11 and 15, for a county with a population between 250,001 and 500,000.
• Between 15 and 21, for a county with a population of more than 500,001.
County apportionment commission selection
Under current law, each county apportionment commission generally consists of the county
clerk, the county treasurer, the county prosecutor, and the county chair of each major political
party. 1 (In a county with a population of 1.0 million or more that has adopted an optional
unified form of government with an elected county executive, the county apportionment
commission is the county board of commissioners. 2)
1
For purposes of the act, major political party means each of the two political parties receiving the most votes for the
office of secretary of state at the most recent general election.
2
This provision, which would be deleted by HB 6171, effectively applies only to Oakland County.
House Fiscal Agency Page 1 of 6
 House Bill 6171 would remove county treasurers and prosecutors from each apportionment
commission. In their place, each county board of commissioners would choose one member of
each major political party from a list of three individuals submitted by the county party chairs.
(If a county does not have a statutory chairperson of a major political party, the chair of the
party’s state central committee would appoint a statutory county chairperson for purposes of
the act.)
All business of a county reapportionment commission would have to be conducted at a public
meeting held in compliance with the Open Meetings Act, as is currently done. In addition, the
bill would require commission meetings to be transcribed or videotaped, with sound and
picture and made available to the public, except for a meeting or part of a meeting that is held
in closed session. Writings prepared, owned, used, possessed, or retained by the commission
or its members, staff, or consultants related to the work of the commission would have to be
made available to the public in compliance with the Freedom of Information Act. 3
Apportionment criteria
Currently, county apportionment commissions must consider the following when drawing
districts, in order of importance:
• Districts must be single-member districts of as nearly equal population as is practical.
• Districts must be contiguous.
• Districts must be compact and of as nearly square shape as is practicable, depending
on the area’s geography.
• A township or portion of a township can only be combined with a city or portion of a
city if necessary to meet the population standard.
• Townships, villages, and cities can only be divided if necessary to meet the population
standard.
• Precincts can only be divided if necessary to meet the population standard.
• Residents of state institutions who cannot legally register to vote must be excluded
from any consideration of representation.
• Districts cannot be drawn to effect partisan political advantage.
Instead, under the bill, a county apportionment commission would have to abide by the
following criteria and order of priority:
• The apportionment plan and all districts must follow all applicable federal laws, such
as the Voting Rights Act.
• All districts must be single-member districts contiguous by land. Areas that meet only
at adjoining corners are not contiguous. (Island areas would be considered to be
contiguous to the city or township of which they are a part, and an island that constitutes
its own city or township would be considered contiguous to the nearest city or
township.)
• A district’s population cannot deviate from the target population by more than 5%,
and the difference in population between the most and least populous districts cannot
exceed 10% of the target population. 4
3
This provision currently only applies to writings prepared, owned, used, in possession of, or retained by the
commission.
4
As is current law, the secretary of state would have to provide each county apportionment commission with the latest
official Census figures within 15 days after publication.
House Fiscal Agency HB 6171 as reported Page 2 of 6
 • Districts cannot disproportionately advantage either major political party. (If the
commission determines that it is not possible to apportion the county without providing
a partisan advantage, then it would have to apportion the districts in such a way as to
provide the least degree possible of partisan advantage without violating the higher-
ranked criteria.)
• Districts must not favor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.
• Districts can reflect consideration of compactness and of city and township boundaries.
Target population would mean the sum of the individuals counted in the census for the
county divided by the total number of districts in that county.
Except as provided below, partisan advantage would be determined in the following
manner:
• The difference between the actual number of minority party districts and the
target number of minority party districts cannot exceed 1. 5
• The proportional number of minority party districts must be determined by
multiplying the minority party vote share in the county by the number of
districts in the county, rounded to the nearest whole number.
• If at least one member of the county apportionment commission demonstrates
that it is possible to draw the proportional number of minority party districts
while complying with the higher-ranked criteria, the target number of minority
party districts is equal to the proportional number of minority districts.
Otherwise, the target number of minority party districts would be the maximum
number of demonstrably possible minority party districts that comply with the
higher-ranked criteria.
However, if these provisions result in an apportionment plan that gives one party a one-
or two-seat majority, partisan advantage would have to be determined by the mean-
median difference, and the plan resulting in a mean-median difference with an absolute
value closest to zero would be the best map under this criterion. The mean-median
difference would be calculated as follows:
1. Sum the votes cast for each major political party’s candidate 6 for the state board
of education within each district for the two most recent general elections in
which county commissioners were elected, excluding special elections for
partial terms.
2. Find the district-level vote share in each district by dividing the total votes cast
for candidates of one party in the district by the summed votes for both parties
in the district.
5
Minority party district would mean a district in which total number of votes cast for minority party candidates for
the state board of education in the two most recent general elections in which county commissioners were elected,
excluding special elections for partial terms, exceeds the total number of votes cast for the other major political party’s
candidates in the same elections. Minority party would mean the major political party receiving the second-highest
number of votes cast for its candidates for the state board of education in the two most recent general elections in
which county commissioners were elected, excluding special elections for partial terms.
6
This provision refers to a singular candidate for the state board of education, although each political party nominates
a slate of two candidates for this office. Other provisions of HB 6171 refer to the sum of the votes cast for both party
nominees.
House Fiscal Agency HB 6171 as reported Page 3 of 6
 3. Calculate the mean of the district-level vote share by summing the district-level
vote shares for all districts in the county and dividing by the number of districts
in the county. The district-level vote share would be calculated by sorting the
district vote shares from lowest to highest; the median is the vote share of the
middle district if the number of districts is odd and the average of the two
middle district vote shares if the number of districts is even. 7
4. Subtract the mean from the median.
A county apportionment commission 8 could not adopt an apportionment plan at the meeting in
which it was proposed, and a proposed plan would have to be published for at least seven days
before it could be adopted. In addition, the apportionment commission of a county with a
population of 250,000 or more would have to hold at least three public hearings on separate
dates and at three different locations before preparing, considering, or adopting an
apportionment plan.
If redistricting is not finalized within 60 days, a panel of three judges would have to apportion
the county. To select the panel, five judges from the Court of Appeals would be randomly
chosen, and the county chair of each major political party would remove one judge from the
list. When apportioning a county, the panel would have to follow the guidelines listed above.
Judicial review
The act allows any registered voter of a county to petition the Court of Appeals to review the
county’s apportionment plan within 30 days after the plan is filed, and the Court of Appeals’
findings can be appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.
House Bill 6171 would require a court reviewing an apportionment plan to review the
following actions and decisions de novo (without consideration of a previous decision):
• The county apportionment commission’s decisions as to how many districts a county
has.
• The commission’s compliance with provisions of the act pertaining to commissioner
selection and public meetings and plan review.
• The adopted plan’s compliance with the ranked apportionment criteria.
The county apportionment commission would bear the burden of proof on the issues under
consideration.
Except for federal court decisions concerning questions of federal law, a reviewing court could
not use or apply any standard of review, test, or analysis taken from, based on, or derived from
a judicial decision made before the bill’s effective date.
MCL 46.401 et seq.
BACKGROUND:
Ballot Proposal 2 of 2018 amended the Michigan Constitution to create the Independent
Citizens Redistricting Commission (ICRC), which is the body responsible for determining the
boundaries of congressional, state Senate, and state House districts after every decennial
7
This provision presumably refers to the calculation of the median district-level vote share.
8
House Bill 6171 refers here to an apportionment “committee.”
House Fiscal Agency HB 6171 as reported Page 4 of 6
 census. 9 The ICRC must abide by specific criteria in proposing and adopting redistricting
plans, including a requirement that districts must not provide a disproportionate advantage to
any political party according to measurements of partisan fairness. Some believe that while
Proposal 18-2 ended the practice of gerrymandering—where politicians draw districts that
favor their own political party—at the state and congressional level, it is still prevalent in
counties because county commission districts are governed by state statute (specifically 1966
PA 261) and not the state constitution.
BRIEF DISCUSSION:
According to committee testimony, gerrymandering has received public attention at the state
and federal level, but its impact on local races is often overlooked. Reportedly, the majority of
counties in Michigan are one-party counties, where all county commissioners represent a single
political party. In 72%–Democratic Washtenaw County, for example, each of the nine county
commissioners are Democrats, leaving Republicans with zero representation despite
comprising 28% of the county’s voters. Some believe that county-level gerrymandering results
in unrepresentative county government, denies minority parties input in the process,
disincentivizes voter engagement, and reduces accountability and public trust in democratic
systems.
Supporters of House Bill 6171 argue that the bill addresses county-level gerrymandering by
making similar reforms as those approved by Michigan voters under Proposal 18-2. By
ensuring that partisan fairness is one of the primary criteria that must be considered when
drawing districts, partisan minorities would be represented proportionally and county
commissions would better reflect the will of the voters. Supporters argue that the bill also
addresses courts’ current inability to intervene in county-level gerrymandering claims. In
addition, the proposed population cutoffs would make common-sense changes to better reflect
today’s county populations.
Opponents of House Bill 6171 raise concerns about removing county treasurers and county
prosecutors, who are elected public officials there to represent the needs of the county, from
apportionment commissions and replacing them with nominated political activists, and they
argue that this change does not align with the intended goal of prohibiting political parties from
choosing their voters. Opponents also raise concerns about putting the burden of proof on
apportionment commissions during legal challenges to an apportionment plan.
FISCAL IMPACT:
House Bill 6171 would result in additional costs to counties related to changes in the
apportionment process and could result in either savings or costs for county commissions,
depending on changes in the number of required districts and commissioners representing those
districts.
The bill’s revised guidelines for district apportionment may result in increased costs to a county
clerk’s office once every 10 years if a county determines new software or contracted services
may be needed to assist with the decennial apportionment process and producing maps in full
compliance with the new guidelines. Increased costs may be needed for some counties for
9
For a full summary of Proposal 18-2, see: https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/PDF/Alpha/Ballot_Proposal_2018-
2_VNP_Redistricting.pdf.
House Fiscal Agency HB 6171 as