OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
C O M M O N W E A L T H O F M A S S A C H U S E T T S
J EFFREY S. S HAPIRO , E SQ ., CIG
INSPECTOR GENERAL
A Review of the MBTA’s
In-Station Customer Service
Contract with Block by Block
JULY 26, 2023
ONE ASHBURTON PLACE, ROOM 1311
BOSTON, MA 02108 | (617) 727 - 9140 | WWW.MASS.GOV/IG
Office of the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1|Page
 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Office of the Inspector General
JOHN W. McCORMACK
STATE OFFICE BUILDING
ONE ASHBURTON PLACE
ROOM 1311
BOSTON, MA 02108
JEFFREY S. SHAPIRO TEL: (617) 727-9140
INSPECTOR GENERAL WWW.MASS.GOV/IG
July 26, 2023
Via Electronic Mail
The Hon. Gina Fiandaca Phillip Eng, General Manager
Massachusetts Department of Transportation Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
10 Park Plaza, Suite 4160 10 Park Plaza, Suite 3830
Boston, MA 02116 Boston, MA 02116
Gina.Fiandaca@dot.state.ma.us Peng@mbta.com
The Hon. Brendan P. Crighton, Senate Chair The Hon. William M. Straus, House Chair
Joint Committee on Transportation Joint Committee on Transportation
State House, Room 109-C State House, Room 134
Boston, MA 02113 Boston, MA 02113
Brendan.Crighton@masenate.gov William.Straus@mahouse.gov
Re: A Review of the MBTA’s In-Station Customer Service Contract with
Block by Block
Dear Secretary Fiandaca, General Manager Eng, Senator Crighton and Representative Straus:
Pursuant to Section 196 of Chapter 46 of the Acts of 2015 (Chapter 46), enclosed please find a
report that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued today entitled A Review of the MBTA’s In-
Station Customer Service Contract with Block by Block.
Under Chapter 46, the MBTA was exempted from the provisions of the Taxpayer Protection Act
when contracting with private companies to perform services “similar to or in lieu of” their own
employees for a three-year period. The general goal of such privatization contracts is to provide better
services at a lower cost.
Chapter 46 also requires the OIG to review and analyze the competitiveness and fairness of the
procurement process, the quality of the services provided by the contract, the expected and actual cost
of the contract and the costs/benefits and to issue a report of our findings no later than 90 days upon
completion of the contract. This report has been delayed past this deadline due, in part, to the complexity
of the work necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the MBTA’s procurement, contract development
and contract administration practices. The OIG deemed it to be in the best interest of the public to take
the additional time to complete a thorough analysis and report. The OIG’s Internal Special Audit Unit
(ISAU) led the review.
 The subject of this review is the MBTA’s 2017 contract with Mydatt Services, Inc. (d/b/a Block by
Block) to provide in-station customer service agents. Under the terms of the contract, Block by Block
provided “transit ambassadors” to assist MBTA riders with directions, fare purchases and accessibility
needs, to report maintenance and cleaning needs to management, and to aid in ensuring the safety and
security of stations.
This report contains a detailed analysis of the Block by Block contract and specific
recommendations to the MBTA that, while particular to this contract, can and should be extrapolated and
applied across all existing and future contracts by MBTA management. Overall, we found that the contract
did result in increased coverage of in-station customer service agents at a lower cost than provided by
MBTA employees. However, it was nearly impossible to determine if customer service was improved given
the deficiencies of the contract such as the lack of performance metrics and vendor oversight and poor
records retention.
The contract exceeded its expected cost by nearly $5.37 million. Roughly $3 million of that
overage is due to the MBTA’s failure to account for special service requests to cover events such as Red
Sox games or concerts when determining its service requirements at the beginning of each contract
extension. Once it was understood that special service requests resulted in increased costs, the MBTA
should have planned for this in subsequent contract periods. Only once in five years did the MBTA factor
in special event coverage when determining the “not-to-exceed” cost, even though professional sporting
events and concerts are planned well in advance and publicly announced.
Additionally, the MBTA paid higher hourly rates than specified in the contract and used to
calculate the annual “not-to-exceed” cost. These higher rates were apparently agreed on by the MBTA
and Block by Block. We were surprised to learn that an entity of the MBTA’s size and scope would
renegotiate rate changes outside of the contract and not memorialize those changes in a written contract
amendment. This is a significant issue for the MBTA, one that its senior leadership should address.
In general, contracts should include specific performance metrics to make clear the level of service
the vendor is expected to provide. Additionally, independent audits, periodic reviews and “secret
shoppers” are standard methods used to evaluate service. The MBTA employed none of these common
tools, so it was difficult to assess if the contract met the goal of improving service. For example, the MBTA
did not even attempt to ascertain how Block by Block transit ambassadors were conducting and reporting
elevator checks. This simple and seemingly small detail has a potentially huge impact on MBTA riders,
particularly those with disabilities.
We understand that the current Block by Block contract contains performance metrics, and that
the MBTA’s Vendor Management team actively reviews Block by Block’s performance. In addition, we
understand that beginning next month, the MBTA is taking specific steps to improve their contract
administration by assigning and documenting a contract manager for contracts over $250,000. We
applaud these efforts.
This is the third Chapter 46 report issued by the OIG in nine months. Our prior reviews of absence
management services and police dispatch services were issued in October and December 2022,
respectively. Taken together, these reports illustrate a troubling pattern that demands attention and
correction. Across these three reviews, the MBTA had consistent issues with record retention, contract
development and management, and vendor oversight, which are essential to ensuring that the
government receives the goods and services it needs for the agreed upon price and quality.
Office of the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 3|Page
 While these contract issues may pale in comparison to the operational and safety challenges that
the MBTA faces, they must not be excused or minimized. These are basic, fundamental and routine
business functions and they are essential to the effective operation of any entity. The fact that they were
so poorly managed by the MBTA is troubling to say the least.
Along with the specific recommendations in this and the two prior reviews, we strongly encourage
the MBTA to explore why it ended up paying Block by Block $356,375 over the expected contract costs in
the Amendment II period, and why it paid $117,200 to hire a consultant to aid in the transition of services,
an expense that Block by Block was contractually obligated to pay.
In closing, I respectfully request that the recommendations contained in this review, as well as
those in the two previous reviews issued last year, be closely reviewed by MBTA senior management.
Without some concrete action on the part of senior management at the MBTA, we can expect more of
the same in the reviews of the four remaining Chapter 46 contracts. Given that these are open contracts,
the MBTA has an opportunity to correct and address some of these issues. Indeed, without substantive
change, future reviews will amount to an exercise in futility. The Office of the Inspector General team and
I are available to answer any questions that you may have.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey S. Shapiro
Inspector General
Enclosure
cc (with enclosure, via email):
The Hon. Michael J. Rodrigues, Chair, Senate Ways & Means Committee
The Hon. Aaron M. Michlewitz, Chair, House Ways & Means Committee
Douglas McGarrah, General Counsel, Department of Transportation
Greg Rooney, Chief of Staff, Department of Transportation
Jeff Gonneville, Deputy General Manager, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Kevin Scanlon, Chief Counsel, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Katie Choe, Acting Chief of Staff, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Thomas P. Glynn, Chair, MBTA Board of Directors
Michael D. Hurley, Clerk of the Senate
Steven T. James, Clerk of the House
State Library of Massachusetts
Office of the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 4|Page
 INSPECTOR GENERAL COUNCIL
Christopher Walsh, Chair – By Governor’s appointment
Susan Terrey, Vice Chair – By designation of Secretary of EOPSS
Attorney General Andrea Campbell – By statute
Auditor Diana DiZoglio – By statute
Comptroller William McNamara – By statute
Michael Caira – By Governor’s appointment
Rachel Ciocci – By Auditor’s appointment
James Morris – By Attorney General’s appointment
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ’S LEADERSHIP
Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Inspector General
Natalie S. Monroe, First Assistant Inspector General
Susanne M. O’Neil, General Counsel
INTERNAL SPECIAL AUDIT UNIT
Emily Pedersen, Director (appointed by the Inspector General)
Kimberly Stanley, Deputy Director
Jesmeen Khan, Investigator
Colin Long, Policy Analyst
Nicholas O'Neill, Lead Counsel
Harley Songin, Investigator
Jarrett Taylor, Coordinator/Investigator
Office of the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 5|Page
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................... 7
Background ................................................................................................................................................. 10
I. The Office of the Inspector General ........................................................................................... 10
II. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ..................................................................... 10
III. The Taxpayer Protection Act and MBTA Waiver ........................................................................ 11
IV. Request for Proposals: In-Station Customer Service .................................................................. 11
V. The Contract with Block by Block ............................................................................................... 13
VI. Block by Block’s Scope of Work .................................................................................................. 13
VII. Contract Rates ............................................................................................................................ 14
VIII. 2002 Accessibility Lawsuit and 2006 Settlement ....................................................................... 14
IX. The ISAU’s Scope and Methodology ........................................................................................... 15
Evaluation of the MBTA’s Procurement Process ........................................................................................ 16
Quality of Services Analysis......................................................................................................................... 21
Expected and Actual Cost of the Contract .................................................................................................. 27
Cost-Benefit Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 36
Areas for Improvement and Recommendations ........................................................................................ 42
I. Procurement Practices and Contract Development ................................................................... 42
II. Contract Administration and Oversight ...................................................................................... 46
III. Records and Information Retention ........................................................................................... 50
IV. Federal Procurement .................................................................................................................. 50
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 52
Appendix A: Rider Complaints by Contract Period ..................................................................................... 55
Appendix B: Net Cost Differential ............................................................................................................... 56
Office of the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 6|Page
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Historically, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA or authority) employed in-
station customer service agents (CSAs) to provide MBTA riders with assistance on matters such as
direction requests, fare purchases and accessibility needs, to report maintenance and cleaning needs to
management, and to aid in ensuring the safety and security of stations.
In an effort to lower costs and improve customer service, the MBTA decided to transition its in-
station customer service functions to an outside company. In 2017, the MBTA issued a request for
proposals (RFP) for those services. Following its selection process, the MBTA contracted with Mydatt
Services, Inc. (d/b/a Block by Block) in July 2017 to provide “transit ambassadors” to cover in-station
customer service responsibilities. The MBTA’s privatization of in-station customer service and its contract
with Block by Block are the subjects of this report.
The Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General’s (Office) responsibility to analyze the Block by
Block contract stems from state legislation – Section 196 of Chapter 46 of the Acts of 2015 (Chapter 46) –
that exempted the MBTA from the requirements of the Taxpayer Protection Act (TPA) for a three-year
period. The TPA, enacted in 1993, established a process that state agencies must follow in hiring a private
company to perform services previously provided by employees of that agency.
The Block by Block in-station customer service contract ended in September 2022, triggering
Chapter 46’s dictate that the Office conduct a review of privatization contracts awarded during the
exemption period. As the statute specifies, the Office’s Internal Special Audit Unit (ISAU) evaluated four
aspects of the MBTA’s privatization of in-station customer service:
1. The competitiveness and fairness of the procurement process resulting in the contract;
2. The quality of the services provided under the contract;
3. The expected and actual cost of the contract; and
4. Whether the costs of the contract exceeded the benefits derived from the contract.
This report analyzes the Block by Block contract through these four criteria and also makes
recommendations for improvement in the MBTA’s administration of vendor contracts.
The competitiveness and fairness of the procurement: While the MBTA’s procurement was
generally fair and competitive, the ISAU found room for improvement. The ISAU concluded that the
MBTA needs to comply with all of the processes outlined in its own procurement manual. While the MBTA
developed accurate and complete RFP specifications that did not restrict competition and did not impose
unnecessary bonding requirements, the authority did not follow the manual’s requirement to complete
an independent cost estimate to inform the reasonableness and competitiveness of responses. In
addition, the MBTA did not follow the exact RFP criteria in scoring technical responses and could not
produce relevant documents related to the evaluation of