RÉSUMÉ DIGEST
SB 333 2024 Regular Session Morris
Present law (C.C.P. Art. 3721) provides that a conventional mortgage is enforced by
ordinary or executory proceedings.
Proposed law would have provided that in any ordinary or executory proceeding to enforce
a mortgage, privilege, or security interest, the judgment or order of executory process
granted may include any amounts which accrue after the rendition of the judgment or order
and until the judicial sale, including, without limitation, obligations to reimburse advances
for taxes and insurance, inspection or other fees provided for by contract, reasonable
attorney fees, and court costs.
Proposed law also would have provided that it shall be enforceable notwithstanding any
other provision of law requiring that a judgment or order specify a definite amount.
Proposed law would have provided that the seizing creditor or his counsel shall, upon the
request of the sheriff, file into the record the payoff amount of the obligation being enforced
including any amounts which have accrued after the issuance of the order of executory
process or the judgment rendered in an ordinary proceeding prior to the date of the sheriff's
sale.
Proposed law would have provided that any party with an interest in the property seized,
including but not limited to mortgage and lien holders, and the defendant, may file a rule to
show cause to traverse the payoff amount filed in accordance with proposed law.
Proposed law would have provided that a judicial sale shall be valid notwithstanding failure
of an interested party to comply with the provisions of proposed law.
Would have become effective August 1, 2024.
(Proposed to amend C.C.P. Art. 3721)
VETO MESSAGE:
"Please be advised that I have vetoed Senate Bill 333 of the 2024 Regular Session. Senate
Bill 333 permits the retroactive inclusion of obligations allegedly owed by a debtor after a
court has rendered a final judgment. Allowing creditors to unilaterally determine and add
unlimited post-judgment fees and costs after a final judgment undermines transparency in
the legal process.
This bill gives mortgage companies and their attorneys an unfair advantage. It would allow
final judgments to include broad language such as "all expenses incurred in enforcing the
note and mortgage" and "all fees and all law charges, costs, fees and expenses incurred in
connection or relating to this proceeding," instead of final, definite amounts reviewed by a
court. Notably, this type of broad language was recently rejected by the Louisiana First
Circuit Reverse Mortg. Sols., Inc. v. Conerly, 22-1054 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/19/23), 2023 WL
3595359. I agree with the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal that definite amounts
should be fixed in the final judgment, and a third person should be able to determine from
the judgment the precise amount owed. Reverse Mortg. Sols., Inc. v. Conerly, 22-1054 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 5/19/23); Wachovia Mortg. Corp. v. Hoover, 2019-1520 (La. App. 1 Cir.
9/21/20), 314 So.3d 42. US. Bank Nat'! Ass'n as Tr. for RFMSI 2005S7 v. Dumas, 21-0585
(La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 246. There is no compelling reason to create an
exception to La. C.C.P. art. 1918, the law on final judgments, for mortgage companies and
their attorneys.
In addition to creating an exception for mortgage companies, this bill creates a presumption
that post-judgment fees and expenses are owed by the debtor without a requirement that the
court review the actual amounts. The bill shifts the burden to the debtor to prove why the
post-judgment fees claimed by the mortgage holder are not owed. This presumption, coupled
with the absence of timely notice requirements and only the potential for judicial review, is
particularly concerning. Debtors may find themselves facing unforeseen and potentially
inflated post-judgment expenses without proper scrutiny or a reasonable opportunity to
dispute these expenses, leading to a lack of transparency and fairness to the debtor.
For these reasons, Senate Bill 333 will not become law."