ENROLLED ORIGINAL
A RESOLUTION
25-706
IN THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
November 12, 2024
To declare the existence of an emergency with respect to the need to amend the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act to codify agency deference and clarify that a
reviewing court or tribunal shall defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a
statute or regulation it administers so long as that interpretation is not plainly wrong or
inconsistent with the statutory or regulatory language or the legislature’s intent.
RESOLVED, BY THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, That this
resolution may be cited as the “Review of Agency Action Clarification Emergency Declaration
Resolution of 2024”.
Sec. 2. (a) The District’s Administrative Procedure Act authorizes the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals to review orders and decisions of administrative agencies in
contested cases. In exercising that review, the Court has the power, “[s]o far as necessary to
decision and where presented, to decide all relevant questions of law, to interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and to determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any
action[.]” D.C. Official Code § 2-510(a)(1). The Court is authorized, among other things, to
“hold unlawful and set aside any action or findings and conclusions found to be:” (A) “Arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;” (B) “Contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;” (C) “In excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of
statutory rights;” (D) “Without observance of procedure required by law, including any
applicable procedure provided by this subchapter;” or (E) “Unsupported by substantial evidence
in the record of the proceedings before the Court.” D.C. Official Code § 2-510(a)(3).
(b) For decades, the Court of Appeals has deferred to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes and regulations unless the agency’s reading was unreasonable. See, e.g.,
Nunnally v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 80 A.3d 1004, 1010 (D.C. 2013) (“Where we determine
that a statutory term is ambiguous, . . . we must defer to an agency’s interpretation of that
ambiguity that is reasonable and not plainly wrong or inconsistent with the legislature’s intent.”);
Eldridge v. D.C. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 248 A.3d 146, 155 (D.C. 2021) (similar). This standard of
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review is substantially similar to the approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984),
and its progeny. This doctrine also traces back to judicial decisions predating the adoption of the
District’s Administrative Procedure Act. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82
(1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Alaska v.
Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1946).
(c) The Court of Appeals has additionally made clear that this deference extends to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and should also be applied by other tribunals
reviewing the work of the administrative agency, like the Office of Administrative Hearings. See
D.C. Dep’t of Env’t v. E. Capitol Exxon, 64 A.3d 878, 879 (D.C. 2013).
(d) Deference has become an important background principle for ensuring stability in the
law. Individuals can rely on agency interpretations as authoritative unless a clear conflict exists
between the agency’s interpretation and the statute or regulation being interpreted. The Council
has also legislated for decades with this background principle and the assumption that an
agency’s reasonable construction of a statute it is charged with administering will be sustained
on judicial review. This principle is consistent with the Council’s understanding of the current
judicial review provision of the District’s Administrative Procedure Act.
(e) In June 2024, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024),
however, the United States Supreme Court overruled Chevron and held that the federal
Administrative Procedure Act prohibits courts from deferring to agencies when they offer
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes.
(f) Notwithstanding the Council’s understanding of the District’s Administrative
Procedure Act, the textual similarities between the scope of review provision in the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, which the Supreme Court interpreted in Loper Bright, and the
judicial review provision of the District’s Administrative Procedure Act may create confusion
and uncertainty as to what standard of review applies when reviewing District agency action.
(g) Therefore, there exists an immediate need to amend section 110 of the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, approved October 21, 1968 (82 Stat. 1209; D.C.
Official Code § 2-510), to clarify that in reviewing an order or decision of the Mayor or an
agency, a reviewing court or tribunal shall defer to the Mayor’s or agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a statute or regulation it administers so long as that interpretation is not plainly
wrong or inconsistent with the statutory or regulatory language or the legislature’s intent.
Sec. 3. The Council determines that the circumstances enumerated in section 2 constitute
emergency circumstances making it necessary that the Review of Agency Action Clarification
Emergency Amendment Act of 2024 be adopted after a single reading.
Sec. 4. This resolution shall take effect immediately.
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